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WRONGFUL LIFE, WRONGFUL BIRTH, AND
JUSTICE IN TORT LAW*
PATRICK J. KELLEY**
The emergence of modem birth control methods and the January
1973 recognition by the United States Supreme Court of a constitu-
tional right to an abortion' have increased the number of persons en-
gaged in aiding couples who want to avoid the birth of a child. These
persons include doctors who prescribe contraceptives or perform steril-
izations or abortions, pharmacists who fill contraceptive prescriptions,
manufacturers who produce contraceptive drugs and devices, and ge-
netic counselors who provide couples with information about the risks
of producing a defective child and the means to prevent inherited dis-
orders.2 This rapid social change has focused attention on a newly sig-
nificant legal problem: should those who undertake 3 to aid couples in
* This paper was written for the Genetic Counseling Task Force, funded by the Pope John
XXIII Medical-Moral Research and Education Center. Another version of this paper will be
published by the Task Force as an appendix to their report. The author thanks Professors Frank
W. Miller, Stanley Paulson, and Jules B. Gerard for their helpful comments on an earlier draft of
this paper.
** Member, Missouri, Illinois, Iowa Bars. B.A., 1965, University of Notre Dame; J.D., 1969,
University of Iowa.
1. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
2. See generally Neel, The Coming of 4ge of Genetic Counseling, in CONTEMPORARY GE-
NETIC COUNSELING 1 (National Foundation-March of Dimes, Birth Defects: Original Article Se-
ries, Vol. IX, No. 4, 1973); Sly, "/at is Genetic Counseling?, in CONTEMPORARY GENETIC
COUNSELING 5 (National Foundation-March of Dimes, Birth Defects: Original Article Series,
Vol. IX, No. 4, 1973).
3. The question of when a person should be judged to have accepted such an undertaking is
an important and difficult one, and is beyond the scope of this paper. That question is critical in
determining whether an obstetrician should be liable for failure to counsel amniocentesis in
Washington University Open Scholarship
920 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW QUARTERLY
preventing the birth of a child by contraception or abortion be liable in
tort for damages when something goes wrong and an "unwanted" child
is born?4
Any unwanted birth conceivably could lead to two different law suits
against one who undertook to aid the parents in preventing that birth.
The parents could sue, claiming that the unwanted birth and subse-
quent responsibilities of parenthood caused them physical pain, emo-
tional distress, and economic loss, or the child himself could sue,
claiming that his birth caused him to have to live a life filled with phys-
ical or mental pain or both. For convenience, commentators have la-
beled the parent's lawsuit an action for "wrongful birth" and the child's
lawsuit an action for "wrongful life."5 The gist of both actions is the
allegedly wrongful failure to prevent the birth of the unwanted child.
In neither case does the plaintiff claim that the defendant caused the
child physical harm. Thus, for example, a suit by a child born because
defendant-doctor negligently failed to diagnose rubella in the pregnant
mother in time to afford her the opportunity to abort the fetus damaged
by the rubella would be a suit for wrongful life,6 and a suit by the
parents of an "unwanted" child against a doctor for negligently per-
forming an ineffective abortion would be a suit for wrongful birth. A
suit by a child against the manufacturer of a drug for injury in utero
caused by his mother's taking that drug while pregnant, however,
would not be a suit for wrongful life, because the manufacturer's con-
duct caused physical harm to the child. Similarly, a suit by the mother
for injury to her caused by a drug she took during pregnancy would not
be a suit for wrongful birth.
pregnancies with a higher-than-normal risk of a defective fetus. Most of the discussions of the tort
liability of genetic counselors simply ignore this critical threshold question.
4. Much has been written on this topic. The leading articles include: Capron, Informed
LDecisionmaking in Genetic Counseling: A Dissent to the "Wrongful Life" Debate, 48 IND. L.J. 581
(1973); Tedeschi, On Tort Liability/or "Wrongful LPee" 1 ISRAEL L. REv. 513 (1966); Note, 4
Cause f Actionfor "Wrongful Lfe" [,4 SuggestedAnalysisl, 55 MINN. L. REV. 58 (1970).
5. Although this terminology has not been accepted by everyone, see Kass & Shaw, The
Risk of Birth D1e/es. Jacobs v. Theimer and Parent's Right to Know, 2 AM. J. L. & MED. 213,
241-43 (1976), most commentators use this terminology. See, e.g., Note, Wrongful Birth in the
Abortion Context-Critique of Existing Case Law and Proposalfor Future Actions, 53 DEN. L.J.
501 (1976); 41 ALa. L. REv. 162 (1977). See also Sherlock v. Stillwater Clinic, - Minn. ,
n.3, 260 N.W.2d 169, 172 n.3 (1977).
6. See, e.g., Gleitman v. Cosgrove, 49 N.J. 22, 227 A.2d 689 (1967); Stewart v. Long Island
College Hosp., 58 Misc. 2d 432, 296 N.Y.S.2d 41 (Sup. Ct. 1968), aff'd on wrongful birth issue, 35
A.D.2d 531, 313 N.Y.S.2d 502 (1970), aj'd, 30 N.Y.2d 695, 283 N.E.2d 616, 332 N.Y.S. 2d 640
(1972); Jacobs v. Theimer, 519 S.W.2d 846 (Tex. 1975).
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The first appellate opinion in a wrongful birth case was published in
1934.' In that case, the Minnesota Supreme Court rejected a claim for
damages caused by the birth of a healthy child following defendant-
surgeon's unsuccessful vasectomy operation on the child's father. The
first appellate opinion in a wrongful life case was published in 1963.8
In that case, an Illinois court of appeals rejected an illegitimate child's
claim for damages against his father for his illegitimacy at birth. Since
these decisions, plaintiffs have brought a number of wrongful birth and
wrongful life cases.9
The wrongful life and wrongful birth claims present novel and
troublesome questions of law to the courts. Those questions take us
ultimately to the fundamental issue of growth and change in the law of
torts: when should courts recognize a new cause of action in tort? This
paper is an attempt to articulate and analyze possible answers to this
basic question and to explore the implications of each answer for the
wrongful birth and wrongful life cases.
I. CRITERIA FOR JUDICIAL RECOGNITION OF
NEW CAUSES OF ACTION
English common-law courts did not start with a set of criteria for
recognizing new causes of action. Originally, the creation of a new writ
or the extension of an old writ may have been seen not so much as the
recognition of a new legal "right," but as an extension of the jurisdic-
tion of the King's Courts over kinds of disputes previously decided by
local or ecclesiastical courts.' 0 After the writ system had solidified,
"new" causes of action developed through a slow and gradual process
of extension of the recognized writs by incremental analogy." This
7. See Christensen v. Thomby, 192 Minn. 123, 255 N.W. 620 (1934).
8. Zepeda v. Zepeda, 41111. App. 2d 240, 190 N.E.2d 849 (1963), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 945
(1964).
9. See notes 57-58, 81-82, 99 infra and accompanying text.
10. See T. PLUCKNETT, A CONCISE HISTORY OF THE COMMON LAW 353-78 (5th ed. 1956);
cf. H. DE BRACTON, ON THE LAWS AND CUSTOMS OF ENGLAND f. 413b 1268 (n.p., n.d.) (S.
Thome trans., vol. IV, 289 (1968)) ("If [a writ] goes beyond existing law, provided it is in accord-
ance with reason and not contrary to law, it must be sustained, provided it has been granted by the
King and approved by his council, ... for it is the king's duty to provide an adequate remedy to
repress every wrong.").
11. T. PLUCKNErr, supra note 10, at 381, notes:
[S]ubstantive law was discussed in terms of procedure. The rights of the parties will be
expressed in the form of writs and pleading: the plaintiff in given circumstances can
bring a particular writ, but if he does, the defendant in certain other circumstances may
Number 4]
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process discouraged broad generalizations about the criteria for recog-
nizing new causes of action precisely because the process took so long,
and proceeded in so many small, incremental steps, that no one in the
midst of the process need recognize what the courts were doing.
In the history of the Anglo-American law of torts, the early part of
the nineteenth century saw a great change in the nature of chasms
bridgeable by the judicial method of incremental analogy. The col-
lapse of the former distinctions between the writs of trespass and case
gave rise to a new classification system based on the distinction be-
tween intended and unintended harms and the further subdivision of
unintended harm into categories of negligently or recklessly inflicted
harms and "faultlessly" inflicted harms for which courts would never-
theless hold an actor liable. 12
The new classification did not drastically alter the previous process
of development by incremental analogy for intentional harms because
actionable intentional harm was subdivided into older categories (such
as assault, battery, and false imprisonment) based on the nature of the
interest with which the defendant intentionally interfered. The "um-
brella" intentional tort (prima facie tort), based solely on the nature of
defendant's conduct and not on the nature of the interest affected,
gained little headway either as an overall classification to replace the
older categories or as a broad catchall for virtually every intentionally
inflicted harm. t3 Consequently, the process of development by analogy
proceeded slowly in the intentional tort field. It remained for litigation
to identify new protectable interests, such as "privacy" and "mental
use a particular plea. Gradually there will come slight modification as cases a little
outside the ambit of the traditional forms are brought in, either by construction or by a
modification of the forms. The result is a change in substantive law, but the machinery
of the change, and its technical expression, will be in the rules about writs and pleadings.
12. See generally S. MILSoM, HISTORICAL FOUNDATIONS OF THE COMMON LAW 344-52
(1969); Prichard, Trespass, Case and the Rule in Williams v. Holland, 1964 CAMBRIDGE L.J. 234;
Roberts, Negligence: Blackstone to Shaw to ? An Intellectual Escapade in a Tory Vein, 50 COR-
NELL L.Q. 191 (1965).
13. Despite the backing of the American Law Institute (RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 870
(1939); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS 49-60 (Tent. Draft No. 22, 1976)), the courts have not
generally adopted the prima facie tort theory. Of the relatively few instances in which it has been
applied, most were cases of interference with economically advantageous relationships. Seegener-
all, Note, The Prima Facie Tort Doctrine, 52 COLUM. L. REv. 503 (1952). Professor Epstein, in a
brilliant commentary, suggests that courts should clarify the precise nature of the personal.inter-
ests protected under the prima facie tort doctrine and recognize that it is harm to those interests,
not the defendant's intention, that provides the basis for the cause of action. Epstein, Intentional
Harms, 4 J. LEGAL STUD. 391 (1975).
[Vol. 1979:919
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tranquility per se," and for litigants to fight the battles over extending
tort liability to intentional interference with those interests, though
both sides recognized, at least implicitly, that the struggle would deter-
mine the creation of a new cause of action.' 4
On the negligence side of the new classification, however, the process
of development changed drastically. Because the classification isolated
the nature of defendant's conduct as the critical factor affecting liabil-
ity, the courts could and did extend liability by the process of incre-
mental analogy to cases in which the interest harmed by defendant's
negligent conduct had never before received judicial protection.15 This
change in the magnitude of judicial change by incremental analogy ob-
viously increased the potential harm from any one decision. It there-
fore behooves both courts and commentators to develop criteria for
determining when "new" causes of action should be granted.
Before one can formulate criteria for judicial recognition of a new
cause of action in tort, however, one must determine the underlying
purpose, rationale, or principle of tort law. Jurists and scholars have
proposed many different underlying principles;' 6 others have argued
that no common principles undergird tort liability.'7 At one level of
generality, perhaps all would agree that the purpose of tort law is to
provide a mechanism for the just allocation of burdens occasioned by
harm one person causes another.
14. See, e.g., Hadley, The Right to Privac, 3 Nw. L. REV. 1 (1894); Magruder, Mental and
Emotional Disturbance in the Law of Torts, 49 HARV. L. REV. 1033 (1936); Warren & Brandeis,
The Right to Privacy, 4 HARV. L. REV. 193 (1890).
15. See S. MILSoM, supra note 12, at 351-52 (1969):
More than language was at stake. There is nothing special about applying a general
principle to a new situation. It is not a great legal step like creating a new tort, sanction-
ing a new writ. Judges who would have hesitated long over the latter have not hesitated
to bring new kinds of facts within the ambit of negligence. But the two processes are in
reality the same. To hold that a duty of care exists in a situation that has not previously
arisen involves precisely the decision that was taken in sanctioning a new writ. The
difference is in its apparent magnitude.
16. See, e.g., G. CALABRESI, THE COSTS OF ACCIDENTS: A LEGAL AND ECONOMIC ANALY-
sIs 26 (1970) ("The principal function of accident law is to reduce the sum of the costs of accidents
and the costs of avoiding accidents."). Seegenerall, J. FLEMING, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE LAW
OF TORTS 1-23 (1967) (tort law should endeavor to impose costs of accidents on those best able to
spread the cost over those benefiting from the activity causing the loss); A. HARARI, THE PLACE OF
NEGLIGENCE IN THE LAW OF TORTS 19-29 (1962); 0. HOLMES, THE COMMON LAW 85-88 (M.
Howe ed. 1963) (basic principle of tort liability is objective moral blameworthiness of defendant).
17. See, e.g., I T. STREET, THE FOUNDATIONS OF LEGAL LIABILITY: A PRESENTATION OF
THE THEORY AND DEVELOPMENT OF THE COMMON LAW xxv (1906), citedin A. HARARI, supra
note 16, at 21; P. WINFIELD, PROVINCE OF THE LAW OF TORTS 5 (1931), eitedin A. HARARI, supra
note 16, at 21 n.10.
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Agreement on this broad statement of purpose suggests that the basic
disagreements between tort theorists may be reducible to disagreements
over the nature of justice. Although one can use any number of differ-
ent theories of justice to analyze tort questions, 8 two theories express
the principal divergent approaches taken by tort theorists: (1) justice in
tort law consists of correcting private injustice by requiring reparation
from one who harms another by unexcused conduct contrary to the
reasonable expectations of the victim; 9 and (2) justice in tort law con-
sists of allocating the burden of accident costs in a way that maximizes
the community's total happiness.2 °
A. The Corrective Justice Theory
The key to the first theory is the notion of private injustice-the fail-
ure of defendant to give plaintiff what is "due" him.2' What is "due" is
18. Professor George Fletcher, for instance, argues that tort law should implement a princi-
ple of fairness patterned on John Rawls' first principle ofjustice. Fletcher, Fairness and Ulily in
Tort Theory, 85 HARV. L. REv. 537 (1972).
[W]e all have the right to the maximum amount of security [from harm] compatible with
a like security for everyone else .... Compensation is a surrogate for the individual's
right to the same security as enjoyed by others . . . . [T]he paradigm of reciproc-
ity . . . requires] us to grant compensation whenever [a] disproportionate distribution
of risk injures someone subject to more than his fair share of risk.
Id. at 550-51.
19. Notions of corrective justice similar to this theory seem to underlie the sophisticated tort
theories of Professor Richard Epstein and Professor George Fletcher. Professor Epstein's analysis
is flawed, however, by his formal adherence to an ordinary-language approach to the question of
justice and responsibility in tort law and his consequent refusal to analyze any further the concep-
tion of justice with which he works. Professor Epstein gives us no reason to believe either that the
ordinary-language basis for ascribing responsibility should be adopted by the courts as the basis of
tort liability or that he has adequately captured the ordinary-language method of ascribing re-
sponsibility. See Epstein, .4 Theory of Strict Liabiliy, 2 J. LEGAL STUD. 151 (1973); Epstein,
Defenses and Subsequent Pleas in a System ofStrict Liablity, 3 J. LEGAL STUD. 165 (1974). See
also Kelly, Causation and Justice, 1978 WASH. U.L.Q. 635. Professor Fletcher, on the other hand,
attempts to superimpose on the basic notion of corrective justice a rigidly egalitarian conception of
justice based on the reasonable expectations of the parties. This attempt leads him to save his
theory by making analytically unsupportable and unexplained assumptions (such as equating the
risk to others of keeping a domesticated pet with the risk to others of having children or friends).
Fletcher, supra note 17, at 547-48. Of course, these risks are equivalent only in the sense that they
are created by conduct that is ordinary, accepted, and thus expected in the community.
20. See, e.g., G. CALABRESI, supra note 16; J. FLEMING, supra note 16; James, Accident Lia-
bility Reconsidered- The Impact ofLiability Insurance, 57 YALE L.J. 549 (1948).
21. One could, of course, object that to decide questions of legal liability based on an analysis
of what conduct was "due" or "owing" the plaintiff is to beg the question. To decide whether to
impose liability, after all, is to determine what conduct is "due" or "owing." The objection, how-
ever, misconceives the nature of the basic argument. The argument does not proceed from an
assumption of legal obligation to a conclusion of legal obligation, but proceeds from. an assess-
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol1979/iss4/2
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the conduct that plaintiff can reasonably expect of that defendant.22
The customs, mores, and laws of the society in which plaintiff and de-
fendant live create, condition, and qualify those expectations. The tort
action is not primarily to vindicate or enforce society's standards, but to
redress or correct a private wrong and thus vindicate plaintiff's claim to
respect for his personal dignity. What that respect requires in any par-
ticular case depends on the cultural context that defines what plaintiff
can reasonably expect of others. This analysis explains how the law of
torts can claim to be based on common morality even though it em-
ploys objective criteria of fault to support liability when defendant's
conduct is not morally blameworthy in the ordinary sense. If the moral
basis for tort law is the notion of private injustice, the law is primarily
concerned with righting a private wrong and only secondarily with
punishing or deterring a blameworthy offense against the society's
moral code.
ment of one's obligations under the principles of private justice to the conclusion of legal obliga-
tion. Those principles, based on the nature of an individual's claims to dignity and respect within
a particular social context, are not themselves empty or circular. Certain facts about the society's
customs, morals, and laws and the relationship between the parties not only are relevant to the
application of the principles of private justice, but also weigh in the decision whether to impose
legal liability; thus, the process of applying these principles to the facts can be analyzed and evalu-
ated as in other noncircular natural-language arguments.
The critic could also respond that the private justice principle just pushes the circularity to
another level. If law influences plaintiffs reasonable expectations, the court always can justify any
result it chooses by a self-fulfilling assessment of plaintiff's reasonable expectations. This objec-
tion simply ignores the fundamental tenet of our legal system that requires courts to decide cases
on past, not future, events. The relevant reasonable expectations of plaintiff remain those that he
held before the decision of his particular case.
22. The analysis in this section follows closely the analysis of private justice in H. SIDGWiCK,
THE METHODS OF ETHICS, ch. V, bk. III (5th ed. 1893), reprinted in JUSTICE AND SOCIAL POLICY:
A COLLECTION OF ESSAYS 6-11 (F. Olafson ed. 1961). Sidgwick's "natural expectations" corre-
sponds to this author's use of the term "reasonable expectations." This author parts company with
Sidgwick on his conclusion that the ideal component in the ordinary conception ofjustice is neces-
sarily utilitarian. The following analysis also has affinities with Roscoe Pound's concept of the
"second jural postulate of civilized society," as explained in R. POUND, AN INTRODUCTION TO
THE PHILOSOPHY OF LAW 86 (rev. ed. 1954):
[I]n civilized society men must be able to assume that their fellow men, when they are in
a course of conduct will act with due care, that is, with the care which the ordinary
understanding and moral sense of the community exacts, so as not to impose an unrea-
sonable risk of injury upon them. ...
The basic difference between the analysis in this paper and that of neo-Hegelians like James
Coolidge Carter, Roscoe Pound, and Benjamin Cardozo, who also stress the relationship between
justice and societal custom, is in the nature of the ideal conception ofjustice and its relationship to
history. This author is not persuaded that mankind is ever progressing toward the ideal. In cases
in which current customs and mores are not dispositive, the judge's task is not to divine the cur-
rent of history, but to determine what respect for human dignity requires.
Washington University Open Scholarship
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The initial problem with this first theory of justice in tort law is its
analytical separateness from the second theory ofjustice. More specifi-
cally, why should the courts attempt to correct private injustice? If the
goal of correcting private injustice derives solely from the more general
social goal of maximizing the community's total happiness, then the
first theory of justice collapses into the second.23 Two answers could be
given to this question.
First, one could argue that the correction of serious private injustice
is a primary, "primitive" goal of government requiring no further justi-
fication beyond the strongly-felt conviction of the community that cer-
tain wrongs ought to be remedied-"there ought to be a law."' 2a This
argument seems to equate what is with what ought to be; that is, it uses
the prevailing customary patterns of conduct in the community to force
those who cause injury by ignoring those patterns of conduct to redress
the injury and thus restore the "good" social order.25 The principal
objection to this rationale is that it simply affirms and perpetuates cur-
rent social arrangements, customs, and mores, without providing any
justification for desirable legal progress toward a better or more just
society. There is no reason a priori to think that society's current cus-
toms, mores, and laws express the perfect formula for respecting
human dignity.26
The second and more persuasive response to this attack on the cor-
rective justice theory27 would proceed as follows. Each person's char-
23. Professor Calabresi's arguments against the corrective justice theory seem to collapse the
theory into the second theory ofjustice. See G. CALABRESI, supra note 16, at 289-308.
24. Cf. R. VON JHERING, THE STRUGGLE FOR LAW 29 (Lalor trans. 1879) ("the struggle for
his right is a duty of the person whose rights have been violated, to himself").
25. Cf. J. CARTER, LAW: ITS ORIGIN, GROWTH AND FUNCTION (1907) (law contrary to cus-
tom is unjust and ultimately ineffective). Carter seems to believe that idealjustice will be achieved
in history. See note 21 supra for the distinction between this author's views and Carter's position.
26. For instance, this response could support liability in the following case in which society's
customs and mores are clearly unjust:
In the country of Minerva members of a particular tribe are thought to be outcasts,
and expected not to talk to members of other tribes. Defendant, a member of the outcast
tribe, who knows full well the probable result of his conduct, talks to plaintiff, with
resulting damage to plaintiff in loss of reputation and status, everyone assuming that
plaintiff must have initiated the conversation.
27. This response is based on arguments derived from Plato. See PLATO, THE LAWS. The
Laws is an extensive commentary on the practical limitations imposed by "necessity" on the
achievement of ideal justice in any particular historical community. This is perhaps most clearly
evident in that part of Plato's discussion in which the Athenian Stranger discusses the limitations
on the achievement of ideal justice even in a newly established colony. Chief among these limita-
tions is the necessity to start a colony with grown men and women who have already been edu-
cated. Id. at Steph. 739-40.
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol1979/iss4/2
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acter is formed to a large extent by experience. One is influenced by
one's family and education and the customs, mores, and laws of one's
community. These influences in a particular historical community
shape one's expectations about the conduct of others within that com-
munity, which in turn influence one's own conduct. Thus, to a large
extent, one's place in a particular historical community gives content to
one's personal identity. If an ideal conception of justice requires re-
spect for an individual's dignity in light of his particular historical iden-
tity, then private injustice occurs when Y causes harm to X by conduct
contrary to X's reasonable expectations. This result would follow even
though the societal customs, mores, or laws on which those expecta-
tions depend do not themselves measure up to the ideal standard of
respect for each one's dignity. Under this kind of ideal theory of jus-
tice, one can legitimately claim the right to be treated by others in the
community in the way that people ordinarily treat others in that com-
munity. The official in a system of corrective justice who deals with
past conduct and past harms must recognize such legitimate claims.
The way to move toward the ideal is not by formulating rules of correc-
tive justice as if the ideal were already achieved, but by educating the
members of society to a higher conception of human dignity. Through
this kind of education, the customs, mores, and laws of the society may
be changed. When these changes have altered the reasonable expecta-
tions of the people in the community, but not before, the officials in a
system of corrective justice may justly change the specific rules of cor-
rective justice to embody the higher conceptions of the dignity of man
now embodied in the society's culture.28
This response to the tension between customary and ideal justice
subtly modifies the answer to the question of why courts should at-
tempt to correct private injustice. The notion of respect for personal
dignity as the solution to the problem of ideal justice provides, at least
implicitly, an answer. Without a governmental mechanism for re-
dressing private injustices, one wronged by another could obtain re-
dress only if he were himself powerful enough or were allied with
others collectively powerful enough to force the wrongdoer to compen-
sate him for the wrong. This method of redress not only would lead to
faction and discord, but also would tend ultimately to distort the fabric
of ordinary social life. The friendless and powerless could not expect
28. See J. CARTER, supra note 25, at 322-23.
Number 4]
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consideration and respect from others.29 The alternative state made
possible by a system of government-administered corrective justice is
thought to be better not because it necessarily will result in greater total
happiness,30 but because it better corresponds to our basic understand-
ing of the equal dignity of all men and women.
Two conclusions derive from this analysis. First, in using the cus-
toms and mores of the community to determine the reasonable expecta-
tions of plaintiff in a system of corrective justice, the judge neither
certifies the validity nor enforces the substance of those customs and
mores; rather, the judge determines only that they have conditioned
plaintiff's expectations about the conduct of others. Thus, a judge in
administering corrective justice may, without loss of personal moral in-
tegrity, rely on a societal custom of which he disapproves. Second, the
traditional tort principle that one owes no duties of affirmative conduct
to strangers31 can be seen as an essential conclusion from this theory of
corrective justice. Dissenters from the prevailing orthodoxy become
subject to liability only if they act in ways contrary to the reasonable
expectations of others in the community. The dissenter is not required
to act in ways inconsistent with his sense of human dignity. To this
extent, therefore, the corrective justice theory protects against the sys-
tem's denial of defendant's claims to dignity and respect as an in-
dependent moral agent. Theoretically, the rules of corrective justice
will not coerce anyone into acting against his conscience.
The above analysis suggests a two-step process for determining
whether to recognize a new cause of action in tort. First, the court must
determine whether defendant has "wronged" plaintiff; that is, whether
defendant harmed plaintiff by conduct manifesting insufficient respect
for plaintiffs personal dignity. The key to this determination is ajudg-
ment about what conduct plaintiff could reasonably expect from de-
fendant in light of the customs and mores of the society. In addition,
29. Plato's Athenian Stranger suggests early in the dialogue that the greatest good of the state
is peace, goodwill, and friendship among men. PLATO, supra note 27, at Steph. 625c-629. Com-
pare Plato's position with Aristotle's notion that political justice is possible only in a community of
equals, where rational principle rather than man rules. ARISTOTLE, NICOMACHEAN ETHIcs, bk.
V, ch. 6.
30. There is no reason to believe a priori that it would. Under utilitarian theories, if enslav-
ing one would maximize total social utility, that slavery would be just. See J. SMART & B. WIL-
LIAMS, UTILITARIANISM: FOR & AGAINST 141-44 (1973).
31. See generally Bohlen, The Moral Duty to Aid Others as a Basis of Tort Liablity (pts. 1-2),
56 U. PA. L. REv. 217, 316 (1908).
[Vol. 1979:919
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the court should ask what interest of plaintiff defendant's conduct en-
dangered. The degree of care that we expect of others commonly dif-
fers according to which of our interests their conduct endangers.32
Interest analysis thus sharpens the search for plaintiff's reasonable ex-
pectations in light of the mores of the society and tends to tie the search
back directly to the underlying concern for vindicating plaintiffs claim
to be treated with respect for his dignity. The court should remember,
however, that plaintiff's reasonable expectations are the controlling
concern; the court's focus on the interests endangered is only an analyt-
ically subordinate method of identifying plaintiffs reasonable expecta-
tions.
After the court has determined that defendant "wronged" plaintiff, it
must decide whether recognition of a cause of action would do more
harm than good. This determination requires a balanced prudential
judgment, for the pursuit of certain social goals may limit and qualify
the pursuit of others. Although the determination may take into ac-
count the foreseeable results of recognizing a particular cause of action,
the decision is not necessarily the result of a utilitarian process because
the criteria for prudential judgment may derive from notions that do
not depend on the utilitarian precept of maximizing total happiness.
In reaching a balanced prudential judgment, the court must evaluate
claims by defendant for judicial respect of his personal dignity or simi-
lar claims by defendant on behalf of others not directly before the
court. Judicial acceptance of excuses--defenses that limit the scope of
the negligence cause of action-most clearly illustrate the balancing
process. In these defenses, defendant implicitly admits that he harmed
plaintiff by conduct contrary to plaintiffs reasonable expectations, but
claims freedom from liability because of additional facts that show
plaintiff could not have expected him to act any differently under the
circumstances; thus, it would be unfair to hold defendant responsible
for something he could not have been expected to avoid. Courts accept
some excuses, such as sudden emergency,3 3 youth,34 physical handi-
caps,35 or unforeseeable physical impairment,36 but reject others, such
32. See Austin, A Pleafor Excuses, in PHILOSOPHICAL PAPERS 175 (2d ed. 1970).
33. See generaly W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS 168-70 (4th ed. 1971).
34. See generally id at 154-57.
35. See generally id at 151-52.
36. See Cohen v. Petty, 65 F.2d 820 (D.C. Cir. 1933).
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as poor judgment37 or insanity.38 To those seeking to rationalize tort
law in terms of personal moral blameworthiness of defendant, these
different results appear incongruous. If, however, one views the proc-
ess as the prudent reconciliation of two competing claims of justice, the
different results tend to make sense.39 In reconciling these claims,
courts may explore the comparative strength of competing claims for
respect and consider whether the good from preventing injustice to de-
fendant is outweighed by the possibility of positive injustice in ad-
ministering the claimed excuse. The probability of error in
determining the excusing facts4' and the relationship between the pro-
posed excusing condition and plaintiff's reasonable expectations4' may
also influence this prudential judgment.
A similar process should take place when courts decide whether to
recognize a new cause of action. The court must reconcile plaintiff's
and defendant's claims to respect for personal dignity when plaintiff
alleges injury caused by defendant's unexpected conduct. One helpful
tool to evaluate the relative strengths of the competing claims is to de-
fine clearly the personal interests of plaintiff affected by defendant's
conduct and the personal interests of defendant and others that would
be affected by judicial recognition of the proposed cause of action.
These latter interests include defendant's interest in avoiding an incor-
rect judgment of liability because of the courts' incompetence to deter-
mine certain questions raised by application of the announced
standard,42 the interests of defendant and others in maintaining harmo-
37. See Vaughan v. Menlove, 132 Eng. Rep. 490 (C.P. 1837).
38. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 283B (1965). See generally W. PROSSER, supra
note 33, at 153-54.
39. For a similar explanation of the selective individualization of the negligence standard in
criminal negligence cases, see G. ERENIUS, CRIMINAL NEGLIGENCE AND INDIVIDUALITY 170-73
(1976).
40. This seems to be the strongest argument for rejecting the insanity defense in torts. See
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 283B, Comment b (1965).
41. When a child engages in a dangerous activity ordinarily undertaken only by adults, some
courts refuse to recognize the excuse of youth. See Dellwo v. Pearson, 259 Minn. 452, 107 N.W.2d
859 (1961). See generaly RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 283A, Comment c (1965).
42. Courts, for example, have traditionally refused to allow recovery for negligently inflicted
emotional harm unaccompanied by any physical impact. See Victorian Rys. Comm'rs v. Coultas,
13 App. Cas. 222 (P.C. 1888).
[I]n every case where an accident caused by negligence had given a person a serious
nervous shock, there might be a claim for damages on account of mental injury. The
difficulty which now often exists in case of alleged physical injuries of determining
whether they were caused by the negligent act would be greatly increased, and a wide
field opened for imaginary claims.
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nious and supportive family relationships, 43 the interests of judges and
defendants in avoiding systematic misuse of the cause of action by
those whom the courts never intended to benefit,44 and the interests of
members of society in avoiding unsettling and disruptive changes in
customary patterns of behavior caused by the threat of liability under
the proposed cause of action.45 These competing claims deserve careful
consideration. A simple appeal to traditional principles of negligence
thus may obscure rather than illuminate the underlying problem of
prudential judgment.
B. The Social Utility Theory
The analysis from the second conception of justice is much simpler.
The only question that the courts need resolve is whether recognition of
the proposed cause of action would maximize social utility. Different
commentators have approached the task of answering that question in
different ways. Professor James46 and others47 presented a theory that
employed the subsidiary, highly controversial theory of the marginal
utility of money to support the conclusion that accident costs should be
placed on those best able to insure against them; hence, losses should
Id. at 225-26. Courts have rejected this limitation in cases in which the causal relationship be-
tween defendant's conduct and plaintifts emotional injury was so clear that the reason for the
general rule seemed inapplicable. See, e.g.. Strazza v. McKittrick, 146 Conn. 714, 156 A.2d 149
(1959); Cf Henderson, Judicial Review of Manufacturers' Conscious Design Choices- The Limits of
.4dudication, 73 COLUM. L. REV. 1531 (1973) (courts are not suited for establishing product safety
standards in products liability cases).
43. Courts, for example, have refused to recognize a cause of action against the husband for
negligent infliction of bodily harm on the wife. Similarly, courts have refused to recognize a
negligence cause of action for bodily injury to a child caused by the father, or vice versa. The
principal reason for this limitation was the concern that recognition of the cause of action would
destroy the peace and harmony of the home. See generally W. PROSSER, supra note 33, at 862-66
(criticizing the rule as applied to intentional torts on ground that little peace and harmony remains
to be destroyed after aggravated intentional harms). The rule has been gradually eroded, prima-
rly because the prevalence of liability insurance lessens the possibility of family disruption by
lawsuits (although it concomitantly increases the risks of collusion and fraudulent claims). See,
e.g, Briere v. Briere, 107 N.H. 432, 224 A.2d 588 (1966); McCurdy, Torts Between Persons in
Domestic Relations, 43 HARv. L. REV. 1030 (1930).
44. This concern led many courts to abolish the cause of action for breach of promise to
marry. See Brown, Breach ofPromise Suits, 77 U. PA. L. REv. 474, 493 (1929); cf. Kalven, Privacy
in Tort Law-Were Warren and Brandeis Wrong?, 31 L. & CONTEMP. PROB. 326, 338-39 (1966)
(attack on right-to-privacy cause of action).
45. See generally Calabresi, The Problem of Malpractice: Trying to Round Out the Circle, 27
U. TORONTO L.J. 131 (1977). But see Helling v. Carey, 83 Wash. 2d 514, 519 P.2d 981 (1974).
46. James, supra note 20.
47. See, e.g., J. FLEMING, supra note 16.
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be spread in small increments over a large group of people. Professor
Calabresi48 elaborated a more subtle theory, which focused on sophisti-
cated notions of deterrence aid efficient allocation of resources to de-
termine the best cost-avoider. Both these elaborations, of course,
would demand significant changes in prevailing tort law to make it
more "just." Professor Posner, on the other hand, employed the utilita-
rian theory of justice to support what he took to be traditional negli-
gence law.49
Most of these theorists studiously avoided analyzing the concept of
justice. More sophisticated theorists recognized that one factor to be
considered in judging the probable results of adoption of a particular
rule is whether the rule violates the community's "primitive" (pre-utili-
tarian?) sense of justice to such an extent that harmful social conse-
quences outweigh the benefits otherwise derivable from its adoption. 50
These utilitarian theorists break down the distinction between the pur-
suit of ideal social justice and the more limited pursuit of corrective
justice within a particular historical society. Under these theories, con-
sequently, one need not decide whether defendant "wronged" plaintiff.
It is enough that any rule imposing liability on defendants under these
circumstances would tend to maximize social utility.
These theories, however, present two central problems. First, they
assume that courts, in administering a tort system, can accurately pre-
dict the consequences of adopting a particular rule. In complex sys-
tems such as societies, the intended consequence is rarely, if ever, the
only consequence. Even with all the facts, one cannot accurately pre-
dict the social consequences of proposed rule changes; moreover,
courts, which were developed to resolve disputes between two individu-
als, have difficulty discovering all facts relevant to that prediction.5 1
The second and more fundamental problem with these theories is
that they support results contrary to concepts of justice based on respect
for the personal dignity of individuals. The classic example comes
from the criminal law, in which utilitarian theories could support pun-
48. G. CALABRESI, supra note 16.
49. Posner, A Theory of Negligence, I J. LEGAL STUD. 29 (1972).
50. See G. CALABRESI, supra note 16, at 291-308.
51. This problem in utilitarian theories played a prominent part in the brilliant attack by
Professors Blum and Kalven on Professor Calabresi. Blum & Kalven, The Empty Cabinet of Dr.
Calabresi" Auto Accidents and General Deterrence, 34 U. CHi. L. REv. 239 (1967).
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ishment of those known to be innocent.52 In tort law as well, utilitarian
theories could support the imposition of liability on one who did all
that plaintiff could reasonably have expected of him. Even one who
acted appropriately in light of the prevailing customs and mores of the
society could be held liable in some circumstances because liability
would, in someone's judgment, ultimately tend to maximize social util-
ity. In automobile accident or product liability cases, for example, util-
itarian theorists argue that because defendant will either be insured or
occupy market position enabling him to pass the cost of the judgment
on to those benefiting from the enterprise, the ultimate burden of liabil-
ity will not be borne by defendant but by those who benefit from the
activity causing the injury. This argument is unpersuasive. In a state
without compulsory liability insurance, defendant may or may not
have liability insurance. Under the basic premises of the utilitarian ar-
gument, however, the court cannot consider the absence of liability in-
surance in determining whether to impose liability, for to do so would
defeat the ultimate social goal by providing a strong incentive not to
obtain liability insurance. The theory thus requires the sacrifice of "in-
nocent" defendants without liability insurance even though under the
terms of the theory itself imposition of liability is not justifiable by ref-
erence to the result in that case.
This apparent injustice reflects the deeper flaw in utilitarian theories
of justice. If any just rule tends to maximize total social utility, tradi-
tional concerns about the just treatment of individuals as individuals
are irrelevant. If the justice of a rule is determinable only by reference
to the ultimate result, any means to the end of maximum social utility
is just, regardless of what that rule entails in the treatment of individu-
als. In the example of automobile liability insurance, it seems unjust to
impose liability on innocent defendants, whether or not they have lia-
bility insurance, because they can reasonably expect to be free from
liability for harm caused by "unavoidable accident.- 53
The law of torts is changing rapidly, and neither theory of justice can
explain all the law, although both theories have had their influence.
The law of negligence as it originally developed and as it is adminis-
tered (by the jury, under very general instructions concerning the con-
52. See Mabbot, Punishment, 40 MIND 152 (1939), reprintedin JUSTICE AND SOCIAL POLICY
39 (F. Olafson ed. 1961).
53. In the traditional sense of harm, an "unavoidable accident" results from no one's "fault."
See generally Brown v. Kendall, 60 Mass. (6 Cush.) 292 (1850).
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duct of the reasonable, prudent person)54 is explainable and justifiable
under the theory of corrective justice. The reasonable man standard
and the assumption of risk defense both focus on the basic corrective
justice concept-plaintiff's reasonable expectations. Much of the law of
strict products liability and some newer developments in the law of
negligence (such as restrictions on the assumption of risk and contribu-
tory negligence defenses) seem explainable in terms of the second the-
ory. Because both theories have their adherents and influence the
development of the law, both will be used to analyze and evaluate the
arguments for and against the proposed causes of action for wrongful
life and wrongful birth.
II. "WRONGFUL LIFE"
In wrongful life cases defendant is accused of wrongful conduct in
failing to prevent the avoidable conception or birth of plaintiff; defend-
ant is not accused of causing specific avoidable physical harm to plain-
tiff. Thus, for example, a suit by a child born because defendant-doctor
negligently failed to diagnose rubella in the pregnant mother in time to
afford her the opportunity to abort would be a suit for wrongful life,
as would a suit by a child against a doctor for negligently performing
an ineffective abortion; 5 a suit by a child against the manufacturer of a
drug for injury in utero caused by his mother's taking the drug while
pregnant would not be a suit for wrongful life, nor would a suit against
a physician whose negligent transfusion of plaintiffs mother with in-
compatible RH blood before plaintiff's conception caused plaintiff
harm when conceived.5 6 Each of these four hypotheticals shares a
common characteristic: plaintiff at the time of defendant's wrongful act
and resulting injury could have had no conscious expectations about
defendant's conduct. This fact, however, does not make the first theory
of justice in torts inapplicable. To grant redress for harm caused by
conduct insufficiently respectful of plaintiff's personal dignity, the
courts use a standard of general community expectations about appro-
priate conduct, embodied in the reasonable person standard. Ordina-
rily in a wrongful life suit, defendant's conduct is contrary to the
54. See, e.g., MISSOURI APPROVED JURY INSTRUCTIONS, No. 11.02 (2d ed. 1969): "The term
'negligence' as used in these instructions means the failure to use that degree of care that an
ordinarily careful and prudent person would use under the same or similar circumstances."
55. See Stills v. Gratton, 55 Cal. App. 3d 698, 127 Cal. Rptr. 652 (1976).
56. See Renslow v. Mennonite Hosp., 40 Ill. App. 3d 234, 351 N.E.2d 870 (1976).
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expectations of plaintiffs parents. The question then becomes whether
that conduct can also be said to have wronged the infant-plaintiff.
Under the first theory of justice, that question would be answered by
determining whether defendant's conduct and its effect on an interest of
plaintiff can be said to have "wronged" plaintiff. To find a "wrong,"
the interest affected must be closely related to plaintiffs personal iden-
tity, and hence his personal dignity. Under the old forms of action the
nature of the affected interest had direct legal significance, for only
harm to the interests defined by those forms of action could support
liability. When the old forms of action broke down, the legal relevance
of plaintiffs interest changed: formerly, it provided a basis for deter-
mining when a private injustice had occurred; now, it is formally useful
only in determining whether compensable damages flow from defend-
ant's negligence. It is not surprising, then, that principles from the law
of damages have figured prominently in the arguments for and against
judicial recognition of the wrongful life cause of action.
Three different interests of plaintiffs have been isolated to formulate
arguments for and against recognition of the proposed wrongful life
cause of action. The first and most obvious interest is plaintiffs interest
in not being born under certain unfavorable conditions, such as with
birth defects or as an illegitimate. In each of the cases in which the
court saw this as plaintiffs interest (every wrongful life case57 except
twosx), the court rejected the proposed cause of action. Commonly,
these courts relied on the following argument, first formulated by Pro-
57. Stills v. Gratton, 55 Cal. App. 3d 698, 127 Cal. Rptr. 652 (1976) (normal child born
despite attempted abortion); Pinkney v. Pinkney, 198 So. 2d 52 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1967) (child
born illegitimate) (overruled in Brown v. Bray, 300 So. 2d 668 (Fla. 1974)); Zepeda v. Zepeda, 41
Ill. App. 2d 240, 190 N.E.2d 849 (1963), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 945 (1964); Gleitman v. Cosgrove,
49 N.J. 22, 227 A.2d 689 (1967) (child born with birth defects due to mother's having rubella
during pregnancy); Williams v. State, 18 N.Y.2d 481, 223 N.E.2d 343, 276 N.Y.S.2d 885 (1966)
(illegitimate child born to mother who was sexually assaulted while a patient in state mental insti-
tution); Stewart v. Long Island College Hosp., 35 A.D.2d 531, 313 N.Y.S.2d 502 (1970) (same),
alPd, 30 N.Y.2d 695, 283 N.E.2d 616, 332 N.Y.S.2d 640 (1972); Dumer v. St. Michael's Hosp., 69
Wis. 2d 766, 233 N.W.2d 372 (1975) (child born with physical deformities and mental retardation
due to mother's having rubella during pregnancy).
58. Becker v. Schwartz, 60 A.D.2d 587, 400 N.Y.S.2d 119 (1977) (following Park); Park v.
Chessin, 88 Misc. 2d 222, 387 N.Y.S.2d 204 (Sup. Ct. 1976), modoed, 60 A.D.2d 80,400 N.Y.S.2d
110 (1977) (affirmance on wrongful life issue). The New York Court of Appeals recently reversed
the Park and Becker wrongful life holdings in a review of the two decisions published in a consol-
idated opinion. Becker v. Schwartz, 46 N.Y.2d 401, 386 N.E.2d 807, 413 N.Y.S.2d 895 (1978).
See notes 69-77 infra and accompanying text.
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fessor Guido Tedeschi:59
Under traditional tort standards, recovery in negligence requires a show-
ing of damage. Damage is loss or detriment, determined by comparing
the present position of the victim with his ideal position had the injurious
event not occurred. There can be no damage in a wrongful birth case
because it is logically impossible to say that plaintiff has suffered a loss or
detriment when the ideal position for purposes of comparison is one in
which plaintiff would not exist.60
Tedeschi's argument depends on the claim that the idea of loss or
detriment logically entails some continuity of personal identity. Thus,
Tedeschi concludes:
The aphorism that "it would be better for man not to have been born"
.. . may be given some meaning by interpreting it as a finding that the
balance between happiness and misery in life is negative. . . but not lit-
erally as a comparison of a person's condition with the condition of not-
being, as in the latter state there is neither happiness nor misery whatso-
ever.
61
Tedeschi's statement that it is logically impossible to discover damage
in a wrongful life case may be too strong. At bottom, his argument
reduces to the claim that the loss or detriment required in the negli-
gence cause of action must be a loss to an identifiable person who
would exist absent defendant's wrongful conduct, but without some
harm that he now suffers.
A law student note62 published in 1970 criticized Tedeschi's argu-
ment for joining two separable questions. The student argued that the
59. Tedeschi, supra note 4.
60. Compare the following analysis by Bernard Williams in The Makropolous Case: Re]fee.
lions on the Tedium of Immortality, in B. WILLIAMS, PROBLEMS OF THE SELF 82 (1973):
None of this-including the thoughts of the calculative suicide-requires my reflection
on a world in which I never occur at all. In the terms of "possible worlds" (which can
admittedly be misleading), a man could, on the present account, have a reason from his
own point of view to prefer a possible world in which he went on longer to one in which
he went on for less long, or-like the suicide-the opposite; but he would have no reason
of this kind to prefer a world in which he did not occur at all. Thoughts about his total
absence from the world would have to be of a different kind, impersonal reflections on
the value/or the world of his presence or absence: of the same kind, essentially, as he
could conduct (or, more probably, not manage to conduct) with regard to anyone else.
While he can think egoistically of what it would be for him to live longer or less long, he
cannot think egoistically of what it would be for him never to have existed at all. Hence
the sombre words of Sophocles "Never to have been born counts highest of all. . ." are
well met by the old Jewish reply---"how many are so lucky? Not one in ten thousand."
Id. at 87.
61. Tedeschi, supra note 4, at 530.
62. Note, supra note 4.
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question of whether the "traditional tort damage framework"63 can be
used to determine damage in a wrongful life case may be answered
apart from the question of whether the courts can value the damage
thus determined. There is no logical reason why the traditional tech-
nique of comparing two states of affairs cannot be used to determine
damages in a wrongful life case. One can, after all, legitimately com-
pare the state in which plaintiff was not born with the present state in
which plaintiff exists with certain defects. The only remaining question
is one of valuation. Common sense tells us that nonexistence could be
preferable to life with certain defects.' 4 Thus, it should be possible in
some cases to assign a negative value to existence. By assigning a zero
value to nonexistence, then, one could value damages.
Although the student did not present it, the following hypothetical
argument supports his position:
We can easily think of cases in which the ideal state compared to plain-
tiff's present state is one in which plaintiff would not exist. Plaintiff, suf-
fering from a fatal disease, refuses to consent to an operation that would
cure the disease while permanently and painfully crippling him. The sur-
geon operates after plaintiff lapses into a coma. We could certainly coun-
tenance a tort suit in which the damages are measured by comparing
plaintiff's present state with the ideal state in which he would not exist.'
This argument and the student's argument suggest that Tedeschi er-
roneously concluded that it is logically impossible to determine dam-
ages by comparing an ideal state in which plaintiff does not exist with
plaintiff's present state. Furthermore, the denial of recovery in a
wrongful life case must be based on a similarly unsupportable judg-
ment that the joys of living always outweigh the sorrows.
The student's plausible counterargument and the surgery hypotheti-
cal supporting his position also suggest that the force of Tedeschi's
argument derives from a more fundamental concept than the compara-
tive basis for determining the extent of damages. That more funda-
mental concept is the notion of personal dignity underlying the
corrective justice model of torts. That concept relates personal dignity
to personal identity in historical, social, and physical contexts.66 Each
person has dignity as he or she is, and, in some sense, because of who
63. Id. at 62.
64. Id. at 65, 74-75.
65. I am indebted to Richard Danzig and James O'Fallon for this argument.
66. See text accompanying notes 21-22 supra.
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he or she is.67 Because defendant's conduct determined only whether,
not how, plaintiff exists, the court cannot say that defendant's conduct
impaired plaintiffs dignity without making the self-contradictory as-
sumption that plaintiff, because of who he or she is, has no dignity.
The revised argument also avoids the problem in the hypothetical
supporting the student's argument. Recovery could be granted in the
hypothetical because the doctor's operation on plaintiff without the lat-
ter's consent constituted an affront to plaintiff's dignity. In ignoring
plaintiff's express wishes, the doctor wronged him, and the court may
measure the enormity of that wrong by comparing the current pain and
suffering that plaintiff wanted to avoid with the apparent peace of the
grave. In contrast, this reasoning does not support recovery in the
wrongful life case because defendant's conduct cannot have violated
any express desires or wishes of an unborn plaintiff.
The hypothetical surgery case and the wrongful life case could be
analogized, however, by assuming that the court in the wrongful life
case simply substitutes an objective judgment about the desirability of
plaintiff's life for the patient's subjective judgment in the surgery hypo-
thetical. If most people would choose not to be born, given the plain-
tiff's prospects, then we can assume that plaintiff would have chosen
not to be born had he been given the choice. This argument neverthe-
less leads to an incongruity: in the name of personal dignity we judge
that another should not have been born; but that judgment itself is an
affront to his dignity. This incongruity suggests that one cannot assign
an "objective" preference to the unborn plaintiff. Ordinarily, courts
find objective standards of conduct by looking for the ordinary or usual
response to common experiences. Because no one can choose not to be
67. R.S. Downie and Elizabeth Telfer, in analyzing what it means to speak of persons as ends
rather than as means, conclude:
So far we have tried to show that respecting a person as an end means regarding him
and treating him as something which is not merely useful but also valuable in itself. The
task which remains is that of trying to explain what is meant by a thing's or a person's
being valuable in itself in those cases which cannot be explained by equating this
description with "desirable in itself."
Roughly, a situation which is desirable in itself is one which should be brought about
because of what it is, while a thing which is valuable in itself is one which should be
cherished because of what it is. The expression "because of what it is" suggests not only
why it is valuable but also what cherishing it amounts to; to cherish a thing is to care
about its essential features-those which, as we say, "make it what it is"-and to con-
sider important not only that it should continue to exist but also that it should flourish.
Hence, to respect a person as an end is to respect him for those features which make him
what he is as a person and which, when developed, constitute his flourishing.
R. DOWNIE & E. TELFER, RESPECT FOR PERSONS 15 (1969).
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born, the "preference" in the student's argument cannot be objective in
the ordinary sense. It simply masks a highly subjective judgment. In
his argument the student emphasizes cases in which plaintiff is men-
tally retarded. Clearly, the author defines himself as an intelligent,
thinking being. Given the choice between nonexistence and existence
as mentally retarded, the author would choose nonexistence. What the
student-or anyone else but the affected child-would choose should
not be decisive, however, unless we are prepared to adopt a thorough-
going paternalism that would justify killing the mentally retarded for
their own good. The objective preference argument thus contradicts
the fundamental principle in our society that the life of each human
being, whether handicapped or not, is valuable and deserves respect
and protection.8
This shift from plaintiffs viewpoint to that of someone else, implicit
in the student note, was made explicit in a 1973 article by Professor
Alexander Capron.69 Professor Capron argued that the infant-plaintiff
in a wrongful life case should have a cause of action because defend-
ant's negligence deprived plaintiffs parents of their right to make an
informed decision about whether to have the child. According to
Capron, the child can sue, even though only the parents' interests seem
to be a stake, because the parents make that decision on behalf of the
68. See Berman v. Allan, 80 N.J. 421, 404 A.2d 8 (1979). The Berman court rejected the
proposed wrongful life cause of action by a child suffering from Down's Syndrome. The court
supported its holding, not by the Tedeschi argument about impossibility of measuring damages,
but by reference to the fundamental societal principle that the life of each person, whether handi-
capped or not, is precious and deserves the respect and protection of the law. The Berman court
therefore concluded that the wrongful life cause of action cannot be recognized because the infant
plaintiff "has not suffered any damage cognizable at law by being brought into existence." Id at
404 A.2d at 12.
69. Capron, supra note 4. In addition to the problems discussed in the text, Professor
Capron's basic argument for recognizing the parents' "right" to full information from the genetic
counselor seems to be just a subtle form of bootstrapping. Basically, Professor Capron first argues
by analogy to the informed-consent-to-treatment cases that there is a "right" to be an informed
decisionmaker, and that this right should be recognized in genetic counseling cases. He then turns
around and argues that legal recognition of this right is "just" because it treats similar cases simi-
larly. By deriving his proposed rule from a right generalized from other kinds of cases, Professor
Capron avoids the onerous task ofjustifying his argument from analogy. In legal arguments from
analogy one ordinarily identifies the basic principles behind analogous cases and then focuses on
the factual differences between the present case and the allegedly analogous cases to see whether
competing principles implicated by the different facts support a different result in the present case.
Professor Capron avoids this process by talking in terms of a "right" formulated in terms general
enough to apply to both cases. This method boils down to the simple assertion that the cases are
similar because they are similar.
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child. Capron solved the problem of turning an injury to the parents'
interests into an injury to the child only by assuming that the parents,
in deciding not to have a child, acted on behalf and in the interests of
the child they decided not to conceive. This assumption breaks down
for the same reasons that the simpler student argument fails. If the
purported interest in not being born cannot be related to the child's
personal dignity, it is difficult to see how the parents' decision not to
have a child can be said to have been made on behalf of and in the best
interests of the child they decided not to have. Once the connection
between the parents' reproductive decision and the interests of the child
they decide not to have is severed, Professor Capron's argument
reduces to the unpersuasive claim that the child should have a cause of
action because the parents have been injured by the child's birth. This,
of course, makes little sense.
A similar flaw infects the reasoning of the only court7° to recognize
the proposed cause of action for wrongful life. In Park v. Chessin"
defendant-obstetricians gave plaintiff-mother erroneous advice about
the probability of giving birth to a defective child. The New York in-
termediate appellate court held that the child had a cause of action for
wrongful life:
[Courts have not previously recognized the cause of action.] But cases are
not decided in a vacuum; rather, decisional law must keep pace with
expanding technological, economic and social change. Inherent in the ab-
olition of the statutory ban on abortion ... is a public policy considera-
tion which gives potential parents the right, within certain statutory and
case law limitations, not to have a child. This right extends to instances in
which it can be determined with reasonable medical certainty that the
child would be born deformed. The breach of this right may also be said
to be tortious to the fundamental right of a child to be born as a whole
functional human being.72
The court's reasoning is unpersuasive. h Recognition of the mother's
constitutional right to an abortion is only relevant to the question of
70. On December 11 and 12, 1977, the Appellate Division, Second Department of the
Supreme Court of New York decided two cases that recognized the wrongful life cause of action.
Becker v. Schwartz, 60 A.D.2d 587, 400 N.Y.S.2d 119 (1977), ajf'das modfled, 46 N.Y.2d 401, 386
N.E.2d 807, 413 N.Y.S.2d 895 (1978); Park v. Chessin, 60 A.D.2d 80, 400 N.Y.S.2d 110 (1977),
af'das modfed, 46 N.Y.2d 401, 386 N.E.2d 807, 413 N.Y.S.2d 895 (1978).
71. 60 A.D.2d 80, 400 N.Y.S.2d 110 (1977), aj'das modfled, 46 N.Y.2d 401,386 N.E.2d 807,
413 N.Y.S.2d 895 (1978).
72. Id. at 88, 400 N.Y.S.2d at 114.
73. Indeed, the New York Court of Appeals reversed the Appellate Division's recognition of
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whether defendant's conduct injured a legally protected interest of the
parents.74 The intermediate appellate court in Park is no more success-
ful than Professor Capron in deriving the child's cause of action from
an injary to the parents' interests. The court asserts only that "the
breach of [parents' right not to have children] may also be said to be
tortious to the fundamental right of a child to be born as a whole func-
tional human being."75 By invoking this "right" of the child, the court
refers indirectly to Woods v. Lancet,76 in which the New York Court of
Appeals recognized a child's cause of action for tortiously inflicted pre-
natal injuries. The analogy to Woods, however, is flawed because the
child in Park, unlike the child in Woods, suffered from an incurable,
unpreventable genetic disease: she never could have been born com-
pletely healthy. Defendants could not have prevented or cured the
child's defect. The Park child's "right" to be born whole, therefore, is
only a right in an Orwellian sense: because this child never could have
been born without the genetic defect, her "right to be born whole" im-
poses a corresponding duty on defendant to prevent her birth. Ironi-
cally, then, the "right to be born whole," as elaborated by the New
York intermediate appellate court, entails death or nonexistence for the
holder.77
Happily, the New York Court of Appeals overturned the intermedi-
ate appellate court's aberrant decision on the wrongful life issue in Park
n: Chessin78 and rejected the analogy to Woods v. Lancet. The court
reasoned that defendant in Park, unlike Woods, did not cause the
child's defect.
Inasmuch as utilitarian tort theories are not tied to a principle of
the wrongful life action in the Park and Becker cases. 46 N.Y.2d 401, 386 N.E.2d 807, 413
N.Y.S.2d 895 (1978).
74. See notes 136-49 infra and accompanying text.
75. 60 A.D.2d at 88, 400 N.Y.S.2d at 114.
76. 303 N.Y. 349, 102 N.E.2d 691 (1951).
77. One is tempted to explain the aberrant result in Park by reference to a number of extra-
neous factors: (1) as ultimate beneficiaries, the parents raised the wrongful life issue in a survival
action, which blurred the distinction between wrongful life and wrongful birth cases; and (2)
counsel evidently argued the case poorly, because Justice Titone in dissent equated wrongful life
and wrongful birth cases and urged rejection of both kinds of actions on the basis of the public
policy favoring "life over nonlife and birth over nonbirth or nonconception," 60 A.D.2d at 90, 400
N.Y.S.2d at 116-a public policy that presumably would justify statutes prohibiting contraception.
Cf Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965) (statutes prohibiting sale of contraceptives held
unconstitutional).
78. See note 73 supra and accompanying text.
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corrective justice, the lack of any private injustice to plaintiff in the
wrongful life cases would not necessarily disqualify the proposed cause
of action under those theories. If ultimate social utility would be maxi-
mized by imposition of liability on defendants in wrongful life cases,
liability should be imposed. Because the typical defendant in wrongful
life cases is a doctor who enjoys superior knowledge, skill, and market
position, both social insurance and best cost-avoider theories presuma-
bly could support imposition of strict liability.
This argument, however, suffers from the same problems as the
wrongful birth strict liability theories discussed later, 9 as well as from
three additional dilemmas. First, the theory supports recovery by the
parents in a wrongful birth action; thus, the problem of wasteful and
inefficient double recovery looms large, particularly because the trier of
fact would likely find that the additional uncompensated harm to in-
fant-plaintiff consisted of pain and suffering-a species of harm that
most utilitarian tort theorists argue should not be compensated, partic-
ularly when the dignitary aspects of the claimed injury (and conse-
quently, the spectre of private vengeance in the absence of judicial
remedy) are weak. Second, recovery by the parents may be contrary to
the community's "primitive sense of justice" and hence weaken the law
as an effective instrument to promote social utility. Third, recognition
of the wrongful life cause of action insults the infant-plaintiff. The de-
cision to sue for wrongful life ordinarily is made not by plaintiff, but by
the parents charged with plaintiffs care and education. The court then
determines whether nonexistence would be preferable to infant-plain-
tiff's life. If plaintiff prevails, the result is a formal judicial declaration
that it would have been better if plaintiff had not been born. Under the
utilitarian theory, why should the state protect the child's life after it
formally declares that the child would have been better off if he did not
exist?80 How can the child achieve any sense of dignity when both the
state and his parents deny that his existence has any value? Would not
the parents' formal rejection of the child's worth necessarily affect the
depth of their subsequent commitment to his care and nurture?
79. See notes 150-54 infra and accompanying text.
80. Cf. Berman v. Allan, 80 NJ. 421,404 A.2d 8 (1979) (wrongful life cause of action violates
basic societal principle of equal respect and legal protection for all human life).
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III. "WRONGFUL BIRTH"
A. The Corrective Justice Theory
1. Arguments Favoring the Cause of Action
Parents in wrongful birth cases ordinarily allege that defendant
failed to take steps to prevent the conception or birth of the child after
expressly or impliedly undertaking to help the parents avoid concep-
tion or childbirth. Parents, for example, have sued a druggist who neg-
ligently filled a prescription for birth control pills with tranquilizers8'
and doctors who negligently performed sterilization operations.8 2
Parents typically claim to have suffered a private injustice. Defend-
ant, who failed to perform his undertaking, has frustrated the parents'
reasonable expectations, and the unwanted conception or birth of the
child has impaired important personal interests. The mother's interest
in maintaining her emotional and physical well-being may have been
harmed by the emotional and physical pain of pregnancy and child-
birth. The parents' interest in economic well-being may have been in-
jured by the costs of pregnancy, childbirth, and childrearing. The
parents' interest in personal autonomy may have been impaired by de-
fendant's failure to provide the parents with either the information
needed to make informed reproductive decisions or the assistance re-
quired to implement reproductive choices. Because these interests so
closely relate to the parents' personal identities, conduct by defendant
that runs contrary to the parents' reasonable expectations constitutes a
private injustice. An estoppel argument buttresses this conclusion. By
undertaking to help the parents avoid conception or childbirth, defend-
ant recognized the importance of these interests to the parents. De-
fendant should not be allowed to deny the importance of those interests
in a subsequent lawsuit for failure to perform his undertaking properly.
The ordinary wrongful birth cause of action thus seems to meet the first
criterion for recognizing a cause of action under the corrective justice
theory.
Arguments against judicial recognition of the cause of action under
this theory focus on the second criterion: would recognition of the pro-
posed cause of action cause more harm than good? At first glance,
however, judicial practice seems inconsistent with the corrective justice
81. See Troppi v. Scarf, 31 Mich. App. 240, 187 N.W.2d 511 (1971).
82. Se, e.g.. Christensen v. Thornby, 192 Minn. 123, 255 N.W. 620 (1934); Bowman v. Da-
vis, 48 Ohio St. 2d 41, 356 N.E.2d 496 (1976).
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theory: courts that reject the wrongful birth cause of action use techni-
cal arguments drawn from the law of damages. A closer examination,
however, reveals that underneath those damage arguments lie concerns
both for preventing wholesale injustice by courts possibly incompetent
to sort out valid from invalid claims and for preventing harm to third
persons caused by recognition of the proposed action. The following
discussion analyzes the technical damage arguments in relation to these
underlying concerns.
2. Arguments Against the Cause of Action
Damages in tort cases are compensatory. The trier of fact first com-
pares plaintiffs current position with the position in which he would
have been had defendant acted properly, and then determines the
award needed to put plaintiff in that position. 3 Damage awards, how-
ever, cannot restore a lost arm or blot out pain and suffering; rather,
they represent the purely economic harm attributable to the loss (medi-
cal expenses, lost wages, impaired earning capacity) plus an amount to
compensate for the intangible, noneconomic detriment of pain and suf-
fering, recognizing that any translation of pain into dollars is necessar-
ily conjectural in the absence of a market for pain or its surcease . 4
The problem in applying the compensatory damages standard to
wrongful birth cases stems from the special benefit rule. That rule, a
simple elaboration of the basic principle of compensatory damages,8 5
requires the trier of fact to subtract from total damages the value of any
special benefit. conferred on plaintiff by defendant's wrongful con-
duct.86 Courts thus use the special benefit rule to limit recovery to cases
in which actual private injustice occurs. In applying the special benefit
rule to the wrongful birth case, the factfinder would have to assign a
dollar value to the intangible benefits of parenthood-the joy of watch-
ing a child develop and grow, the love given and the love returned-
and then subtract that amount from the sum of the economic cost of
giving birth to and raising a child and the dollar value of the pain and
suffering of pregnancy, childbirth, and parenthood.
83. See C. MCCORMICK, HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF DAMAGES 560-62 (1935).
84. See J. STEIN, DAMAGES AND RECOVERY: PERSONAL INJURY AND DEATH ACTIONS 16-17
(1972).
85.. See T. SEDGWICK, 1 A TREATISE ON THE MEASURE OF DAMAGES 98 (9th ed. A.
Sedgwick & J. Beale 1912).
86. See C. MCCORMICK, supra note 83, at 146-48; RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 920 (1939).
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Problems with this calculation led the New Jersey Supreme Court
originally to reject a wrongful birth action brought by parents of a de-
fective child. The court reasoned in Gleitmon v. Cosgrove that triers of
fact were incompetent to weigh the "intangible, unmeasurable, and
complex human benefits of parenthood" against the "alleged emotional
and money injuries" from parenthood of a defective child.87 A Michi-
gan appellate court attacked this reasoning in the leading case of Troppi
v. Scarf.88 In that case defendant-pharmacist negligently filled plain-
tiffs oral contraceptive prescription with tranquilizers, causing plain-
tiffs to produce a normal, healthy, but unplanned child. Plaintiffs
claimed damages for the wife's lost wages, medical and hospital ex-
penses, the pain and anxiety of pregnancy and childbirth, and the eco-
nomic costs of rearing the child. The court reasoned that these items of
damages were no different than those that courts have traditionally
compensated.8 9 Furthermore, the trier of fact could be trusted to value
compensable benefits because this valuation involves precisely the
same factual issues that Michigan courts previously had left to the trier
of fact in a prior interpretation of the Michigan wrongful death act
under which parents received compensation for loss of the companion-
ship and services of a deceased child.9" Because courts had previously
entrusted to the trier of fact each individual item of damage or benefit
entering into the calculation of net damages under that act, the court
could again leave this calculation to the trier of fact.9
The Troppi court's argument succeeded only because it focused at-
tention on the individual components of the net damage calculation
and away from the calculation itself. That calculation, however, is the
issue. The basic fear is that triers of fact in wrongful birth cases cannot
accurately make the determination required by the special benefit rule;
therefore, they cannot sort out valid from invalid claims and could
cause more injustice than they would cure. The Troppi court's argu-
ment does not allay these fears. The Troppi court cited cases92 in which
the courts allowed the trier of fact to assign dollar values to relatively
87. Gleitman v. Cosgrove, 49 NJ. 22, 29, 227 A.2d 689, 693 (1967), overruledby Berman v.
Allan, 80 N.J. 421, 404 A.2d 8 (1979).
88. 31 Mich. App. 240, 187 N.W.2d 511 (1971).
89. Id. at 246, 187 N.W.2d at 513.
90. Id. at 262, 187 N.W.2d at 521.
91. Id.
92. Goodwin v. Ace Iron & Metal Co., 376 Mich. 360, 137 N.W.2d 151 (1965); Routsaw v.
McClain, 365 Mich. 167, 112 N.W.2d 123 (1961); Wycko v. Gnodtke, 361 Mich. 331, 105 N.W.2d
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intangible items of damage when it was already clear, if the trier of fact
believed plaintiffs version of what happened, that defendant's conduct
had harmed plaintiff. In each instance, the court allowed the trier of
fact to value intangible injuries in determining total, not net, damages.
Under those circumstances, the irreducibly conjectural character of the
valuation did not bother the court. The risk of overvaluation of intan-
gible elements of damage could justifiably fall on the wrongdoer who
had clearly harmed plaintiff, and even if the trier of fact undervalued
the intangible elements of damage, the judgment at least repaired
plaintiff's tangible economic losses.
The wrongful birth case is different. To determine net damages the
trier of fact must offset one intangible (the joy and love brought by the
child) against the sum of another intangible (the sorrow and pain of
pregnancy, childbirth and parenthood) and certain tangible economic
losses. Furthermore, in cases in which the unplanned or unwanted
child is living with the parents at the time of the trial, the trier of fact
must forecast future intangible benefits and detriments. Given these
peculiarities in wrongful birth cases, the ordinary justification for per-
mitting the trier of fact to determine intangible items of damage breaks
down. Courts cannot tell solely by examining plaintiffs version of
what happened whether a jury believing plaintiffs evidence would find
that the defendant harmed plaintiff. The jury must offset one intangi-
ble against another before it can determine that defendant harmed
plaintiff at all. Delegation of this determination would empower the
jury to decide, by balancing values arbitrarily assigned to intangibles,
whether the conditions exist to allow it to assign values to intangibles.
The need for judicial control over essentially lawmaking decisions thus
justifies a special rule of law to determine which kinds of cases should
go to the jury.93
A second feature of the net damage calculation that undercuts the
118 (1960); Howard v. City of Melvindale, 27 Mich. App. 227, 183 N.W.2d 341 (1970); Wolverine
Upholstery Co. v. Ammerman, I Mich. App. 235, 135 N.W.2d 572 (1965).
93. This problem vanishes, of course, in a wrongful birth case, if one identifies a legal right-
the right to choose whether to abort an unborn child, or the right to choose whether to employ
contraceptive measures-that is impaired by the defendant's negligence. See Note, supra note 5,
at 501. Because one might deem any interference with that right a harm, the traditional justifica-
tion for letting the jury assign values to intangibles would then apply. This analytical ploy seems
suspect. The only "right" protected by the traditional negligence cause of action is the right to be
free from negligent infliction of actual physical or economic damage. The proposed exception to
this general rule for negligent impairment of a woman's reproductive choices, therefore, would
have to be based on constitutional grounds. The constitutional argument for judicial recognition
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Troppi analysis is the relationship between the offsetting intangibles. It
is at once a fact and a mystery that the pain and the joy of parenthood
are inextricably bound together. We worry about our children and
grieve at their suffering and their failures because we love them. That
love is the source of the joy and the sorrow of parenthood. Most par-
ents would find it odd to be asked to count up the joys on one side of
parenthood and the sorrows on the other, as if the one did not in some
fundamental sense depend on the other. The courts that rejected a
cause of action for wrongful birth, both before and after Troppi, seem
to reflect this common understanding that isolating and weighing the
joys and sorrows of parenthood is impossible.94 One could object, of
course, that separability may depend on the facts of the individual case.
Judges should not enshrine their personal experience of parenthood in
a general rule that would prevent other, less fortunate parents from
proving that under their circumstances95 the unplanned child was a net
detriment.
The process of proving that an unplanned child is a net detriment
raises a third objection to the net damage calculation. The child, a
nominal stranger to the litigation, may be hurt. The judgment of liabil-
ity in a wrongful birth case would stand as an official, public pro-
nouncement that the child's existence is a net detriment to his parents,
despite all the love and joy he offers them. The child's discovery of this
judgment could devastate his sense of self-worth and his relationship
with his parents.96 This effect on the child points to a deeper flaw in the
of a cause of action for wrongful birth is very weak. See notes 136-49 infra and accompanying
text.
94. See, e.g., Terrell v. Garcia, 496 S.W.2d 124, 128 (rex. Ct. App. 1973), cert. denied, 415
U.S. 927 (1974).
95. See Troppi v. Scarf, 31 Mich. App. 240, 256-57, 187 N.W.2d 511, 518-19 (1971); Kass &
Shaw, supra note 5, at 227-34; Note, supra note 5, at 516-18.
96. The court in Rieck v. Medical Protective Co., 64 Wis. 2d 514, 219 N.W.2d 242 (1974),
clearly perceived this problem. After rejecting a proposed wrongful birth action by plaintiff-par-
ents against their obstetrician for negligent failure to diagnose pregnancy in time for a safe abor-
tion, the court added the following note, apparently addressed to the child:
Since the child involved might some day read this decision as to who is to pay for his
support and upbringing, we add that we do not understand this complaint as implying
any present rejection or future strain upon the parent-child relationship. Rather we see
it as an endeavor on the part of clients and counsel to determine the outer limits of
physician liability for failure to diagnose the fact of pregnancy.
id. at 520, 219 N.W.2d at 245-46. The same problem troubled the Minnesota Supreme Court in
Sherlock v. Stillwater Clinic, - Minn. -, 260 N.W.2d 169 (1977). Although the court felt "com-
pelled" by "obedience to the rule of law" to recognize the parents' cause of action for wrongful
birth, the court added:
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wrongful birth cause of action. As the court in Coleman v. Garrison97
observed, judicial recognition that "under certain circumstances a child
would not be worth the trouble and expense" would tend to contradict
our traditional affirmation of the ultimate value of each human life.98
These three problems with the wrongful birth damage calculation
provide weighty reasons for rejecting the proposed cause of action.
Other weighty reasons, however, support recognition of this action.
Defendant's wrongful conduct frustrated the reasonable expectations of
plaintiffs and resulted in the unwanted birth of a child. The accompa-
nying pain and expense of parenthood is pain and expense that plain-
tiffs had intended to avoid and that defendant undertook to help them
avoid. If the child is defective, the increased pain and expense are even
more compelling reasons for imposing liability.
3. Intermediate Positions
a. Recovery limited to damages from pain and expense of
pregnancy and childbirth
After Troppi most courts9 9 and commentators'0 followed the Michi-
gan court's lead and analyzed away the conflict of principles in the
proposed wrongful birth cause of action. A number of courts, however,
attempted to formulate intermediate positions to accommodate the
[We are not unmindful of the deep and often times painful ethical problems that cases
of this nature will continue to pose for both courts and litigants. It is therefore our hope
that future parents and attorneys would give serious reflection to the silent interests of
the child and, in particular, the parent-child relationships that must be sustained long
after legal controversies have been laid to rest.
Id. at -, 260 N.W.2d at 176-77 (footnote omitted).
97. 327 A.2d.757 (DeL Super. Ct. 1974), a'd, 349 A.2d 8 (Del. 1975).
98. Id. at 761.
99. Stills v. Gratton, 55 Cal. App. 3d 698, 127 Cal. Rptr. 652 (1976); Custodio v. Bauer, 51
Cal. App. 2d 303, 59 Cal. Rptr. 463 (1967); Anonymous v. Hospital, 33 Conn. Supp. 126, 366 A.2d
204 (Super. Ct. 1976); Jackson v. Anderson, 230 So. 2d 503 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1970); Troppi v.
Scarf, 31 Mich. App. 240, 187 N.W.2d 511 (1971); Betancourt v. Gaylor, 136 N.J. Super. 69, 344
A.2d 336 (1975); Ziemba v. Sternberg, 45 A.D.2d 230, 357 N.Y.S.2d 265 (1974); Bowman v. Davis,
48 Ohio St. 2d 41, 356 N.E.2d 496 (1976).
100. See Kass & Shaw, supra note 5; Thayer, Liability to a Family/or Negligence Resulting in
the Conception and Birth of a Child, 14 ARiz. L. REv. 181 (1972); Comment, Busting the Blessing
Balloon: Liabilityfor the Birth of an Unplanned Child, 39 ALB. L. REv. 221 (1975); Note, Misfea.
sance in the Pharmacy: .4 Bundle of "Fun, Joy and Affection?", 8 CAL. W.L. REV. 341 (1972);
Note, supra note 5, at 501; 38 BROOKLYN L. REV. 531 (1971); 3 CUM.-SAM. L. REV. 220 (1972); 76
DIcK. L. RaV. 402 (1972); 3 SETON HALL L. REV. 492 (1972); 47 TUL. L. REV. 225 (1972) 40
U.M.K.C. L. REV. 264 (1971-72); 13 WM. & MARY L. REV. 666 (1972).
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competing principles. In Coleman v. Garrison"0' a Delaware court ar-
gued that plaintiffs in wrongful birth cases should recover damages
only for the expense and pain of pregnancy and childbirth, not for the
expense of raising the child.'0 2 In Sherlock v. Stillwater Clinic'03 the
Minnesota Supreme Court reached a similar, though less drastic, con-
clusion. It allowed the wrongful birth cause of action, but held that any
benefits to the parents from the child's aid, comfort, and society could
be offset against only the costs of rearing the child.'" Parents who
claimed damages only for the expense and pain of pregnancy and
childbirth could thus avoid any application of the special benefit rule.
The Coleman court gave the following three reasons for its rule: (1)
the net damage from raising a child is necessarily speculative; (2) par-
ents who keep an unwanted child rather than give it up for adoption
should be estopped from asserting that the detriments of parenthood
outweigh the benefits; and (3) any judicial judgment that a child is a net
detriment to its parents would be contrary to fundamental public mo-
rality.'0 5 The Sherlock court was moved by the harm to the child and
the parent-child relationship from the parents' claim that the child was
a net detriment.0 6 The court reasoned that this consideration could
not justify the complete rejection of the wrongful life cause of action,
but expected its special offset rule to deter parents from seeking recov-
ery for the costs of child-rearing. 0 7
At first glance, the Coleman solution seems perfect. By turning the
wrongful birth cause of action into one for "wrongful pregnancy," the
court can continue to affirm the ultimate value of human life yet ac-
commodate the traditional tort law demands for redress of injury
caused by departures from customary and expected standards of be-
havior. On closer examination, however, the Coleman arguments ap-
pear flawed.
The estoppel argument cited by the Coleman court 108 is unpersua-
101. 327 A.2d 757 (Del. Super. Ct. 1974), af'd, 349 A.2d 8 (Del. 1975).
102. Id. at 761-62.
103. - Minn. -, 260 N.W.2d 169 (1977).
104, Id. at -, 260 N.W.2d at 176.
105. 327 A.2d at 761.
106. - Minn. at -, 260 N.W.2d at 177. See notes 96-98 supra and accompanying text.
107. - Minn. at - n.15, 260 N.W.2d at 177 n.15.
108. See text accompanying note 105 supra. The Troppi court dealt with a similar issue when
it rejected defendant's argument that plaintiffs should have mitigated damages through abortion
or adoption. Troppi v. Scarf, 31 Mich. App. 240, 257-60, 187 N.W.2d 511, 519-20 (1971). As a
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sive. The mother may decide to keep the child to avoid both the heart-
ache of giving up her child and the social disapproval visited on
mothers who give their children up for adoption. Thus, one of the
"benefits" weighed by plaintiffs in deciding whether to keep the child is
the avoidance of a harm that would result from the alternative. That
defendants' wrongful conduct forces plaintiffs to choose between un-
palatable alternatives should not estop plaintiffs from claiming that the
chosen alternative caused them harm. 109 Put simply, the avoidance of
injury from giving up one's child for adoption is not an offsetting bene-
fit of parenthood.
The Coleman and Sherlock courts' treatment of the special benefit
rule is also unpersuasive. The special benefit rule seems to require
courts to subtract the benefits of parenthood from total damages, even
when damages are limited to the harms from pregnancy and childbirth,
because parenthood follows pregnancy and childbirth. The Coleman
and Sherlock courts thought otherwise: both emphasized that the Re-
statement of Torts110 limits the special benefit rule to cases in which the
interest benefited is identical with the interest harmed. The courts' at-
tempt to separate the interest in avoiding pregnancy and childbirth
from the interest in avoiding parenthood, however, is unconvincing.
First, separability can be shown only by emphasizing the possibility of
giving up the child for adoption; thus, whatever persuasive force ema-
nates from the separability argument derives solely from the seriously
flawed estoppel argument discussed above.Il' Second, the broad "same
interest" language adopted by the Restatement of Torts to express a
limitation on the special benefit rule goes beyond the cases on which
the limitation was apparently based." 2 Those cases all dealt with the
practical matter, the issues may be indistinguishable, but the court's argument in Coleman is prop-
erly understood as one of estoppel, because it argues that plaintiffs' retention of the child evi-
dences a judgment that the benefits of parenthood outweigh detriments, not that plaintiffs should
have mitigated damages by aborting the child or placing it up for adoption.
109. Cf. Troppi v. Scarf, 31 Mich. App. 240, 257-60, 187 N.W.2d 511, 519-20 (1971) (similar
rejoinder to the mitigation argument).
110. REsTATEMENT OF TORTS § 920, Comment b (1939).
111. See notes 108-09 supra and accompanying text. Thus, the Troppi court, which rejected
the estoppel argument in its mitigation of damages guise, had little trouble in also rejecting the
separable interest argument. "Since pregnancy and its attendant anxiety, incapacity, pain, and
suffering are inextricably related to child bearing, we do not think it would be sound to attempt to
separate those segments of damage from the economic costs of an unplanned child in applying the
'same interest' rule." 31 Mich. App. at 255, 187 N.W.2d at 518 (1971).
112. Comment b to § 920 contains no reference to cases, and Professor Seavey, the reporter for
this section, published no commentary on this section. In his personal copies of preliminary drafts
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rule that any increase in the market value of plaintiff's land caused by
an improvement on defendant's land does not reduce the damage to
plaintiff's use and enjoyment of the land attributable to that improve-
ment." 3 The increased market value is only a benefit to plaintiff in
case he sells. If he chooses not to sell, no offsetting benefit exists, and
defendant's wrongful act should not force plaintiff to sell to mitigate
damages. The principle behind these cases is the same as that used
above to reject the Coleman court's estoppel argument, and therefore,
undermines rather than supports the Coleman court's proposed rule.
Finally, the Coleman "wrongful pregnancy" rule seems to yield ex-
actly the wrong result in an action against a genetic counselor for the
birth of a defective child. Plaintiffs in this type of case would not be
particularly interested in avoiding the pain and expense of pregnancy
and childbirth; rather they would want to avoid the birth of a defective
child. To allow damages for the pain and expense of pregnancy and
childbirth, but not for the special expenses attributable to the child's
defect, would ignore both plaintiffs' expectations and the specific inter-
est harmed by defendant's conduct.
b. Recovery limited to special expenses attributable to birth defects
The Texas and Wisconsin courts have adopted a second solution to
the conflict of principles in the wrongful birth case. These courts deny
recovery in wrongful birth cases when the unplanned or unwanted
child is normal and healthy." 4 When defendant's wrongful conduct
prevented the parents from seeking an eugenic abortion, the courts au-
thorize recovery, but limit damages to the special expenses occasioned
by the child's defect."I5
of this section, however, preserved at Harvard Law School's Library, a number of typed and
scribbled citations appear. Preliminary Draft #1, Group 5-Damages (dated Dec. 13, 1937), and
Preliminary Draft #3, Group 5-Damages (dated Mar. 21, 1938). Adoption of the "interest"
language at the time of the third draft probably reflects the influence of Dean Pound's "jurispru-
dence of interest" on the Harvard contingent.
113. See Harvey v. Georgia S. & F. R.R., 90 Ga. 66, 15 S.E. 783 (1892); Marcy v. Fries, 18
Kan. 353 (1877); Ewing v. City of Louisville, 140 Ky. 726, 131 S.W. 1016 (1910); Brown v. Vir-
ginia-Carolina Chem. Co., 162 N.C. 83, 77 S.E. 1102 (1913).
114. See Terrell v. Garcia, 496 S.W.2d 124 (Tex. Ct. App. 1973), cert. denied, 415 U.S. 927
(1974); Hays v. Hall, 477 S.W.2d 402 (Tex. Ct. App. 1972) (dicta), re'd on other grounds, 488
S.W.2d 412 (Tex. 1972); Rieck v. Medical Protective Co., 64 Wis. 2d 514, 219 N.W.2d 242 (1974).
115. Jacobs v. Theimer, 519 S.W.2d 846 (Tex. 1975); Dumer v. St. Michael's Hosp., 69 Wis. 2d
766, 233 N.W.2d 372 (1975).
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The Wisconsin court gave no reason for this distinction."16 The
Texas court objected "to an award based upon speculation as to the
quality of life and as to the pluses and minuses of parental mind and
emotion" when the alleged injury is the birth of a normal, healthy
child. 117 The objection thus does not apply when the child has birth
defects: "The economic burden relate[s] solely to the physical defects
of the child. . . [and] lie[s] within the methods of proof by which the
courts are accustomed to determine awards in personal injury cases."' 1 8
The Texas court's reasoning is unpersuasive. Courts had previously re-
jected recovery in wrongful birth cases because they could not weigh
the intangible benefits of parenthood against the intangible detriments.
No one ever doubted that courts could measure the tangible economic
burden imposed by parenthood. In the eugenic abortion case, for ex-
ample, the court under the Texas approach could add the measurable
expense attributable to the child's defect to the previously measurable
economic burden, but would still run aground on the problem of
weighing the offsetting intangibles.
Although the court's stated reasons seem inadequate, one can defend
the result. Oddly enough, that defense would single out as a virtue
what three prior commentators"19 thought to be an error in the Texas
position. Defendant's wrongdoing caused the birth of a defective child,
but did not cause the defect. Had defendant acted properly, plaintiffs
would not have had the child. Thus, under the ordinary compensatory
damage standard, the trier of fact would determine the extent of dam-
ages by comparing the present state of plaintiffs-the parents of a de-
fectiv'e child-with their alternative state-a couple without this child.
Instead, the Texas court compared plaintiff's present state with an im-
possible state in which they would have had a normal child. The Texas
court thus adopted a new measure of damages contrary to the tradi-
tional compensatory damage standard.
This unusual measure of damages has two distinct advantages.
Under this standard the jury does not have to weigh intangible benefits
116. Dumer v. St. Michael's Hosp., 69 Wis. 2d 766, 233 N.W.2d 372 (1975). The court merely
noted the factual difference between this case and the prior case: "[In Rieck, plaintiffs] sought to
recover the entire expense of raising a normal, healthy but claimed unwanted child during its
dependency. Here the parents sue only for the expense occasioned by the congenital defects." Id.
at 775, 233 N.W.2d at 376.
117. 519 S.W.2d at 849.
118. Id.
119. Kass & Shaw, supra note 5, at 234-39; Note, supra note 5, at 511.
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and detriments to determine whether there is legal injury. The court
determines as a matter of law that injury occurred, and asks the jury to
measure only the tangible expense attributable to the child's defect.
Furthermore, because the jury is never asked whether, all things con-
sidered, the child is more of a burden than a joy to his parents, the
court avoids the potentially damaging judgment that the child is a net
detriment to his parents.
Any compromise can be attacked from two directions, and the Texas
court's compromise is no exception. Those who favor denial of the
wrongful birth cause of action under any circumstances would argue
that the Texas approach avoids a case-by-case adjudication of net det-
riment by embodying in a legal rule the cruel judgment that a defective
child is always a net detriment 20 and a normal child is always a net
benefit. The Texas court, however, did not intend its measure of dam-
ages to be compensatory under the ordinary tort standard; it is difficult,
therefore, to see how the distinction between normal and defective chil-
dren embodies any judgment that defective children as a class are net
detriments to their parents. The Texas court simply recognized that
most people would rather avoid the special anguish and expense associ-
ated with a defective child, regardless of the ultimate balance between
benefits and burdens. By holding that the birth of a defective child
constitutes legal injury to those who wanted to avoid that birth, the
court just protects the expectations of the parties--expectations that are
consistent with the common assumptions of the community. By adopt-
ing an avowedly noncompensatory measure of damages, the court pro-
vides a remedy for an obvious wrong and avoids the unfortunate
consequences of net detriment determinations otherwise required by a
rigid compensatory damage scheme.
One could respond to this argument with an attack on the noncom-
pensatory measure of damages used by the Texas court. First, when-
ever the costs occasioned by the child's defect exceed the net
compensatory damages, defendant is treated unjustly, for he must pay
more than the harm he caused. Conversely, whenever the net compen-
satory damages exceed the costs occasioned by the child's defect, plain-
tiff is treated unjustly. Second, common-law damage principles afford
120. The dissenting judge in the Wisconsin case attacked the majority for adopting a legal
distinction between normal and defective children that "smacks too much of a Hitlerian 'elimina-
tion of the unfit' approach." Dumer v. St. Michael's Hosp., 69 Wis. 2d 766, 780, 233 N.W.2d 372,
379 (1975).
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no basis for a noncompensatory damage standard. Under our legal
system courts in tort cases do not impose noncompensatory punitive
damages without first finding that defendant's conduct was malicious
or outrageous. 12' The Texas noncompensatory standard, then, is an in-
fringement on the legislative prerogative to impose fines for wrongful
conduct.
In cases that fall within the Texas rule, however, plaintiffs have indi-
cated by their conduct that they wanted to be parents of a normal child,
and defendant undertook to help them achieve that goal. If defendant
had acted properly, plaintiffs would have had the opportunity to
achieve that goal, either by contraception plus adoption or by an imme-
diate abortion and a subsequent pregnancy. The Texas rule merely at-
tempts to put plaintiffs in the position they expected to be in with
defendant's help. The contract measure of damages-expectation
damages---thus supports the Texas rule. Because the malpractice cause
of action originally was a tort-contract hybrid based on the implied
undertaking of a member of a common calling, 122 no serious obstacles
impede adoption of a contract measure of damages when the tort meas-
ure of damages proves unsatisfactory. Moreover, because the proposed
measure of damages attempts to put plaintiff in the position originally
intended by both parties, adoption of the expectation standard results
in no injustice to either party.
Those in favor of recognizing the wrongful birth cause of action in
all cases could argue that because plaintiffs in the ordinary wrongful
birth action had indicated their intention not to have any children and
defendant undertook to help them achieve that aim, the expectation
damages argument supports a cause of action for wrongful birth of a
normal child. Furthermore, insofar as the Texas compromise depends
on a community consensus that the unwanted birth of a defective child
is a serious harm, one can just as well argue that the widespread use of
contraception and abortion indicates a community consensus that,
under certain circumstances, the unwanted birth of a normal child is a
serious harm. The arguments used to defend the Texas compromise
against attacks from one side thus eliminate any defense against attacks
from the other.
121. See generally Morris, Punitive Damages in Tori Cases, 44 HARV. L. REV. 1173 (1931);
Note, Exemplary Damages in the Law of Torts, 70 HARM. L. REV. 517 (1957).
122. See generally McCoid, The Care Required of Medical Practitioners, 12 VAND. L, REV.
549, 550-57 (1959).
[Vol. 1979:919
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol1979/iss4/2
WRONGFUL LIFE, WRONGFUL BIRTH
But this, of course, is not true. In the wrongful birth suit for the birth
of a normal child, the expectation measure of damages is necessarily
the same as the compensatory measure of damages: plaintiffs wanted
to avoid the birth of any child. Thus, no principled basis is available to
avoid the net compensatory damage calculation, with all its unfortu-
nate consequences. Furthermore, the strength of the community con-
sensus about the harm or its severity to plaintiffs personal interest or,
indeed, to the relative importance of the interest at stake, may differ
greatly if the unwanted child is defective rather than normal. Rejection
of the wrongful birth cause of action for the birth of a normal child is
not based on a logical deduction, but on a prudential judgment that the
harm from authorizing the jury to make the net damage calculation
outweighs the benefits from enforcing the expectations of the parties.
One may reach a different judgment on this issue than the Wisconsin
and Texas courts, but it seems clear that courts must balance signifi-
cantly different considerations in deciding whether to allow a cause of
action for wrongful birth of a defective child than it balances in decid-
ing whether to allow the cause of action for wrongful birth of a normal
child. One cannot simply reject the Texas approach as internally in-
consistent.
c. Recovery limited to contraception wrongful birth cases
A court could allow the wrongful birth cause of action when defend-
ant's conduct prevented contraception, but bar the action when defend-
ant's conduct prevented an abortion. Before Roe v. Wade23 and Doe v.
Bolton, 24 the reasons for this distinction were persuasive. First, most
states prohibited abortion by criminal statutes that reflected the funda-
mental policy that all human life is precious. To allow recovery in tort
for denial of the opportunity to abort would violate this fundamental
public policy. 25 Furthermore, to prove that defendant's conduct
caused injury, plaintiff would need to show that she would have
aborted the child had defendant acted properly. Arguably, plaintiff
could never prove that defendant's conduct was the proximate cause of
123. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
124. 410 U.S. 179 (1973).
125. See Stewart v. Long Island College Hosp., 35 A.D.2d 531,313 N.Y.S.2d 502 (1970), aft'd,
30 N.Y.2d 695, 283 N.E.2d 616, 332 N.Y.S.2d 640 (1972); f. Gleitman v. Cosgrove, 49 N.J. 22,
227 A.2d 689 (1967) (policy recognized, but not tied to abortion statute).
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her injury while the state criminal law prohibited abortion. 126 Finally,
the wrongful birth suit for denial of the opportunity to abort is poten-
tially more damaging to the child and his relationship to his parents
than the suit for contraceptive failure. Parents in an abortion case con-
tend that they would have aborted this child had defendant acted prop-
erly. The child existed as a genetically independent, separate human
being during pregnancy, 127 and could reasonably identify with himself
in the womb. 128 Thus, the parents' revealed intention to abort is a more
serious threat to the child's sense of worth and his relationship with his
parents than the parents' revealed intention to avoid conception in the
contraception wrongful birth cases.
The Supreme Court in Roe v. Wade' 29 and Doe v. Bolton, t30 how-
ever, arguably weakened the bases for this distinction by adopting
guidelines that invalidated the criminal abortion statutes in all fifty
states. Commentators argued after Roe and Doe that the public policy
and proximate cause arguments against the abortion wrongful birth
cause of action fell with the statutes on which they were based. 3
Careful analysis, in their view, revealed that the public policy and
proximate cause arguments are equivalent. A statute that made abor-
tion a criminal act did not necessarily preclude abortion: plaintiff
could have proven by a preponderance of the evidence that, had de-
fendant acted properly, she would have obtained a legal abortion
outside the state or an illegal abortion within the state.' 32 Because she
might prove that defendant's conduct was the cause in fact of her in-
jury, the fiat ban on recovery under the proximate cause rubric must be
based on policy considerations going beyond simple causation theories.
Those policy considerations, in the days before Roe v. Wade, were not
126. See Gleitman v. Cosgrove, 49 N.J. 22, 48, 227 A.2d 689, 703 (1967) (Francis, J., concur-
ring); Jacobs v. Theimer, 519 S.W.2d 846, 850-51 (Tex. 1975) (Daniel, J., dissenting).
127. See L. AREY, DEVELOPMENTAL ANATOMY 58 (7th ed. 1965).
128. Cf. B. WILLIAMS, PROBLEMS OF THE SELF 1, 19 (1973) (bodily identity is always a condi-
tion precedent to personal identity).
129. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
130. 410 U.S. 179 (1973).
131. See, e.g., Kass & Shaw, supra note 5, at 220; Note, supra note 5.
132. Cf. Gleitman v. Cosgrove, 49 N.J. 22, 227 A.2d 689 (1967) (three out of four judges in
majority assumed that plaintiff's mother could somehow have obtained an abortion, yet rely on
public policy against abortion to support rejection of proposed wrongful birth .cause of action);
Jacobs v. Theimer, 519 S.W.2d 846 (Tex. 1975) (because plaintiffs' allegations of proximate cause
were not contested at summary judgment stage, court would assume that plaintiff's wife would
have obtained legal abortion somewhere had defendant-physician informed her of birth defect
risk).
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difficult to identify. Because abortions were generally illegal, and thus
patently contrary to public policy, it would also have been contrary to
public policy to award damages for the allegedly wrongful denial of the
opportunity to abort. After Roe and Doe, then, the proximate cause-
public policy arguments fall because the state no longer has a public
policy against abortion.
The commentators' argument, however, suffers from its assumption
that the state legislatures repealed the criminal abortion statutes and
thus rejected the prior public policy against abortions. Abortion on de-
mand nationwide was adopted by judicial decision, however, not by
democratic vote, so the question becomes whether the constitutional
interpretation adopted in Roe and Doe precludes the states from imple-
menting a public policy against abortion by distinguishing between
abortion and contraception wrongful birth cases. The controlling case
is Maher v. Roe, 33 in which the Court upheld a legislative classification
that provided indigents with medical care for childbirth but not for
abortion. 134 The Court justified the distinction between childbirth and
abortion on the ground that the state had a legitimate interest in pro-
tecting potential human life.'35 The Maher argument could be applied
to support the distinction between abortion and contraception in
wrongful birth cases: the state does not by the classification interfere
directly with the pregnant woman's abortion decision; the state's legiti-
mate interest in protecting potential human life, therefore, suffices to
sustain the distinction against equal protection attack.
Plaintiffs in abortion wrongful birth cases would attempt to dis-
tinguish Maher by pointing out that the availability of free medical
care only for childbirth may very well influence an indigent pregnant
woman's decision whether to abort or carry to term; thus, the classifica-
tion can be said to advance a public policy to protect potential human
life. The distinction between abortion and contraception in wrongful
birth cases, on the other hand, cannot advance that public policy; a
pregnant woman's inability to recover damages from one who negli-
gently or intentionally deprives her of the opportunity to abort, or who
negligently performs an ineffective abortion, would not influence her
decision to abort or carry to term. The only reason for the distinction,
therefore, is hostility toward abortion. The classification is thus uncon-
133. 432 U.S. 464 (1977).
134. Ad. at 479.
135. Id. at 474.
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stitutional, even under the Maher analysis, for it interferes directly with
the abortion decision by punishing those who would seek an abortion.
The weakest part of this argument is plaintiffs' contention that the
classification does not advance the state's interest in protecting poten-
tial human life. If all the Constitution requires to sustain the classifica-
tion is a conceivable rational relationship between the classification
and a legitimate state interest, the distinction between abortion and
contraception in wrongful birth cases would be constitutional. Surely,
the legislature could reasonably assume that provision for a wrongful
birth cause of action for contraception cases, but not for abortion cases,
would have some deterrent effect: some women might choose child-
birth over abortion because the legal protection against malpractice is
greater in childbirth; some women before conception might choose
contraception rather than abortion as a family planning device because
of the differences in legal protection against malpractice. Because al-
ternative, more direct methods to achieve these goals (such as educa-
tion about contraception) may impose less of a burden on the abortion
decision, the distinction might not withstand any stricter scrutiny than
the conceivable rational relationship test, but under Maher this test ar-
guably controls the issue and the proposed distinction would be consti-
tutional.
B. Alternative Theories Supporting the Wrongful Birth Cause of
Action
1. Constitutional arguments
One commentator 36 and two courts 37 have argued that courts re-
jecting the cause of action for wrongful birth in either abortion or con-
traception cases unconstitutionally interfere with the woman's right to
privacy recognized in Griswold v. Connecticut, 38 Roe v. Wade,139 and
Doe v. Bolton. 40 If this argument is sound, courts could not use the
compensatory damage arguments analyzed abovema4 to reject the pro-
136. Note, supra note 5.
137. Sherlock v. Stillwater Clinic, - Minn. -, 260 N.W.2d 169 (1977); Bowman v. Davis, 48
Ohio St. 2d 41, 356 N.E.2d 496 (1976). See also Troppi v. Scarf, 31 Mich. App. 240, 253, 187
N.W.2d 511, 517 (1971) (relying on Griswold to support constitutional right to wrongful birth
cause of action for failed contraception).
138. 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
139. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
140. 410 U.S. 179 (1973).
141. See notes 83-98 supra and accompanying text.
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posed cause of action for wrongful birth, but would have to recognize
the cause of action. Two arguments have been advanced to support
this conclusion.
First, if defendant's wrongdoing precludes plaintiff from the oppor-
tunity to choose an abortion or an effective contraceptive, the state
court's subsequent refusal to grant a damage remedy is a delegation of
power to private individuals to bar access to abortion or contraception,
similar to the spousal consent requirement held unconstitutional in
Planned Parenthood v. Danforth.4 ' This argument is unpersuasive.
The spousal consent statute in Planned Parenthood flatly prohibited
abortion unless the husband consented. Thus, a woman unable to get
her husband's consent was precluded by law from obtaining an abor-
tion. Refusal to recognize a cause of action for wrongful birth, on the
other hand, does not constitute governmental interference with the wo-
man's right to contraception or abortion. The Constitution does not
require state courts to grant tort recovery for private interference with
the exercise of constitutional rights. Furthermore, defendant's conduct
in wrongful birth cases could not meet the requirements of the federal
civil rights statute 43 that authorizes civil actions for certain private in-
terferences with federal constitutional rights. 44
Second, the court's denial of the proposed wrongful birth cause of
action is arguably a denial of equal protection. To treat a wrongful
birth cause of action differently than similar causes of actions based on
the constitutional right to abortion and contraception, the state must
demonstrate a compelling state interest. 145 Because the arguments for
recognition of the proposed cause of action fairly evenly balance those
arguments against the proposal, 146 no compelling state interest can be
found. This argument also is unpersuasive. In Maher v. Roe 147 the
Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of a state statute that au-
142. 428 U.S. 52 (1976).
143. 42 U.S.C. § 1985 (1976).
144. See Griffin v. Breckenridge, 403 U.S. 88 (1971). The Griffin court interpreted 42 U.S.C.
§ 1985(3) to reach private conduct, but only when that conduct involved a specific intent to de-
prive the plaintiff of his rights on "some racial, or perhaps otherwise class-based, invidiously dis-
criminatory animus." 403 U.S. at 102. In the ordinary wrongful birth case based on a negligence
theory, the defendant would have neither the requisite intent nor the invidiously discriminatory
animus required by the statute.
145. See Troppi v. Scarf, 31 Mich. App. 240, 187 N.W.2d 511 (1971); Bowman v. Davis, 48
Ohio St. 2d 41, 356 N.E.2d 496 (1976).
146. See notes 54-80 supra and accompanying text.
147. 432 U.S. 464 (1977).
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thorized free maternity care for indigents, but refused to fund non-ther-
apeutic abortions for indigents. 48 The Court found that the distinction
drawn between abortion and childbirth did not directly interfere with
an indigent woman's constitutional right to decide whether to abort;
rather, the distinction reasonably related to a constitutionally legiti-
mate state interest in protecting potential human life.14 9 The same
analysis applies here. The distinction between ordinary tort cases and
wrongful birth cases does not directly interfere with a woman's consti-
tutional right to choose contraception or abortion. Consequently, a ra-
tional relationship to any legitimate state purpose will justify the
distinction. The purposes discussed above-avoidance of speculative
damage awards, avoidance of injury to a third party from the litigation,
and avoidance of inconsistent judgments-certainly constitute legiti-
mate state interests to support the distinction between wrongful birth
cases and other tort cases.
The constitutional arguments for judicial recognition of the wrongful
birth cause of action are seriously flawed. Those cases which recognize
a constitutional right to contraception and abortion merely reinforce
the argument that the parents in the ordinary wrongful birth case have
suffered a private injustice through conduct by defendant contrary to
their reasonable expectations; those cases do not require the courts to
recognize the cause of action.
2. Strict Liability Theories
The most popular argument against strict liability for medical acci-
dents is the difficulty in proving that medical treatment rather than dis-
ease caused any particular result.'5M That argument probably does not
apply in most wrongful birth cases. If the sterilization operation or the
abortion procedure is not successful, the subsequent birth of a child can
be traced directly to defective, though perhaps nonnegligent, medical
care. Similarly, in genetic counseling cases expert testimony could help
the courts determine whether the genetic advice was wrong.
148. Id. at 479.
149. Id. at 475-77. Somewhat surprisingly, in light of its prior opinion in Roe v. Wade, the
Court found constitutionally permissible the purpose to encourage childbirth over abortion.
150. See Epstein, Medical Malpractice: The Casefor Contract, 1976 AM. B. FOUNDATION
RESEARCH J. 87, 141-47; Keeton, Compensationfor MedicalAccidents, 121 U. PA. L. REV. 590, 597
(1973); King, In Search of a Standard of Carefor the Medical Profession: The 'Mcceted Practice"
Formula, 28 VAND. L. REv. 1213, 1224 (1975).
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Both the "best cost-avoider" and the social insurance theories could
be used to support imposition of liability on surgeons who fail to steril-
ize or abort successfully and genetic counselors whose inaccurate ge-
netic advice resulted in the birth of a defective child. Under these
theories the court could impose liability without finding defendant neg-
ligent. It would be enough under Calabresi's best cost-avoider theory
that the surgery was unsuccessful or that the genetic advice was inaccu-
rate. Liability should be imposed because the surgeon or the counselor,
as the case may be, is in a better position than his patients to act to
avoid the unwanted result. It also would be enough under the social
insurance theory that the surgery was unsuccessful or the advice was
incorrect. Liability should be imposed because the surgeon or the ge-
netic counselor can insure against liability for unsuccessful surgery or
incorrect advice and pass the cost of insurance on to those who benefit
from surgery or genetic counseling.
Two arguments can be made against the strict liability proposal,
however, based on the two general weaknesses in utilitarian theories-
the assumption that consequences are predictable and the justification
of results that deny respect to individuals' personal dignity.
Imposition of strict liability on surgeons and genetic counselors on
either the best cost-avoider theory or the social insurance theory could
lead to unacceptable consequences neither intended nor predicted. The
adoption of the social insurance theory in product liability losses led to
dramatic increases in product liability insurance costs and the refusal
of insurance companies to underwrite some kinds of product liability
risks. 5 ' Adoption of strict liability for surgeons and genetic counselors
in wrongful birth cases would run the risk of forcing insurance cost so
high that many potential defendants might be unable to obtain liability
insurance and many potential patients might be unable to obtain de-
sired services. The imposition of a strict liability standard in wrongful
birth cases could also have unfortunate effects on the practice of sur-
gery or genetic counseling itself. Because the most significant threat of
liability is from suits by parents of defective children, genetic counsel-
ors might be inclined to resolve every diagnostic or counseling doubt in
favor of the solutions (avoiding conception, aborting the possibly af-
fected fetus) that would minimize their risk of liability, rather than pro-
15 1. See I INTERAGENCY TASK FORCE ON PRODUCT LIABILITY, PRODUCT LIABILITY: FINAL
REPORT OF THE INSURANCE STUDY, ES 3-7; ch. 2, 13-22; ch. 3, 4-14 (1977).
Number 4]
Washington University Open Scholarship
962 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW QUARTERLY
mote the best interests of the patient. 52 Surgeons might refuse to
perform sterilization operations, or dramatically increase the price of
such operations.
Most importantly, however, imposition of strict liability on nonneg-
ligent genetic counselors seems to deny the counselor's and the patient's
claims to personal dignity. The counselor could claim that it is unfair
to impose liability on him when his conduct fulfilled the reasonable
expectations of his patient. To impose personal liability on him be-
cause he is a good insurance conduit or the best cost-avoider treats him
as a pawn in a utilitarian game rather than as a responsible moral agent
within society.' 53 Moreover, the patient who cannot choose lower-cost
genetic counseling-without built-in insurance against the results of in-
correct counseling-could claim that no demonstrably good reasons ex-
ist for impairing his personal autonomy.
Recent commentators have discussed extensively the question of
strict liability for medical accidents.' 54 To date, however, no court has
imposed liability under a strict liability theory, and the question of lia-
bility in wrongful birth cases has always been raised in the context of a
negligence or malpractice theory. The logic of the utilitarian theory of
justice, however, ultimately points toward a no-fault system.
IV. CONCLUSION
Recent medical and legal developments have increased both the
number of cases in which a person attempts to help a couple prevent
conception or childbirth and the number of cases in which such at-
tempts are unsuccessful. Faced with the inevitable claims for legal re-
152. Professor Calabresi recognizes this problem of optimal medical care as the central prob-
lem in a no-fault system for medical malpractice. Calabresi, supra note 45. Professor Calabresi's
"solution," presented ostensibly as a joke, would require mandatory participation in health main-
tenance organizations, including mandatory life insurance and wage maintenance insurance. Pro-
fessor Calabresi attempts to disarm us by clucking over the extremely high economic costs and
interference with individual liberty that his "joke" would necessarily entail. Ultimately, however,
the joke is on us, for Professor Calabresi evidently seriously supports this proposal. Id. at 141.
153. See Epstein, supra note 150, at 105.
154. See Calabresi, supra note 45; Carlson, A Conceptualization of a No-Fault Compensation
Systemfor Medical Injuries, 7 L. & Soc'v REV. 329 (1973); Keeton, supra note 149; O'Connell,
No-Fault Insurancefor InjuriesArsingfrom Medical Treatment: 4 Proposalfor Elective Coverage,
24 EMORY L.J. 21 (1975); Ross & Rosenthal, Non-Fault-Based Medical Injury Compensation, in
U.S. DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH EDUCATION & WELFARE, APP. VOL., REPORT OF THE SECRE-
TARY'S COMMISSION ON MEDICAL MALPRACTICE 450 (1973).
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dress for such failures, the courts have had to decide whether to
recognize new causes of action for "wrongful life" or "wrongful birth."
Courts using arguments drawn primarily from the law of damages
have unanimously rejected the cause of action for wrongful life and
have adopted several damages positions on the wrongful birth cause of
action. These results make little sense in terms of the formal law of
damages and the modem view of negligence as an all-pervasive princi-
ple of liability. If one sees the courts' different arguments in these cases
as unarticulated expressions of traditional corrective justice theories,
the results make more sense: the wrongful life claim fails to meet the
first prerequisite for recognizing a cause of action (a private injustice to
plaintiff); the wrongful birth claim meets the first prerequisite, but
presents the courts with a difficult prudential judgment of whether rec-
ognition of the cause of action would cause more harm than good.
The courts' search for compromise or intermediate positions in
wrongful birth cases is remarkable in the light of virtually unanimous
commentary that supports across-the-board recognition of the cause of
action under "traditional" negligence theories. The pull of an almost-
forgotten and vaguely articulated notion of corrective justice still re-
mains strong.
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